{"id":10024,"date":"2018-07-19T13:12:00","date_gmt":"2018-07-19T17:12:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.publicknowledge.org\/uncategorized\/part-iii-cost-of-exclusion-as-a-proxy-for-dominance-in-digital-platform-regulation\/"},"modified":"2018-07-19T13:12:00","modified_gmt":"2018-07-19T17:12:00","slug":"part-iii-cost-of-exclusion-as-a-proxy-for-dominance-in-digital-platform-regulation","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/part-iii-cost-of-exclusion-as-a-proxy-for-dominance-in-digital-platform-regulation\/","title":{"rendered":"Part III: Cost of Exclusion as a Proxy for Dominance in Digital Platform Regulation"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is the third blog post in a series on regulating digital platforms.\u00a0<\/em>You can view the full series <\/span>here<\/a>.\u00a0Haz clic\u00a0<\/span>aqu\u00ed\u00a0<\/a>para leer en espa\u00f1ol.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

In my last blog post<\/a>, I explained my working definition for what constitutes a \u201cdigital platform.\u201d Today, I focus on another concept that gets thrown around a lot: \u201cdominant.\u201d While many regulations promoting consumer protection and competition apply throughout a sector, some economic regulations apply to \u201cdominant\u201d firms or firms with \u201cmarket power.\u201d Behavior that is harmless, or potentially even positive when done by smaller companies or in a more competitive marketplace, can be anticompetitive or harmful to consumers when done by dominant firms — regardless of the firm\u2019s actual intent.<\/p>\n

For reasons discussed in my previous blog posts<\/a>, defining what constitutes \u201cdominant\u201d (or even identifying a single market in which to make such a determination), presents many challenges using the traditional tools of analysis favored by antitrust enforcers and regulators. I therefore propose that we use the cost of exclusion (\u201cCOE,\u201d because nothing in policy is taken seriously unless it has its own acronym) as the means of determining when we need to apply regulation to \u201cdominant\u201d firms. That is to say, the greater the cost to individuals and firms (whether as consumers or producers or any of the other roles they may play simultaneously on digital platforms), the greater the need for regulations to protect platform users from harm. If a firm is \u201ctoo big to lose access to,\u201d then we should treat that firm as dominant.<\/p>\n

When Do We Distinguish Between General Sector Regulation vs. Regulation of Dominant Firms?<\/strong><\/p>\n

We must recognize at the outset that — contrary to the insistence of some of my Libertarian opposite numbers — we do not regulate solely to address market failure or market power. Rather, when a business becomes central to our economic or social well being, it requires some level of oversight to ensure that all members of the public are treated fairly and that unexpected or unanticipated problems don\u2019t cause significant disruptions in commerce. Additionally, we may have other public policy goals, such as public safety, that require regulation.<\/p>\n

But regulations are not binary. It\u2019s not a question of simply on\/off. Some regulations always need to apply. For example, we apply the health code to all restaurants, no matter how small. And yes, that does indeed drive up the cost of doing business, but since you are just as sick if you get food poisoning in a family-owned diner as you would be getting it at Chipotle, we as a society have decided it\u2019s worth it. Likewise, if I am going to leave my money in a bank, or borrow money to buy a car or a house, it both facilitates commerce and protects consumers to have some basic rules in place governing what sort of institutions can do that and what default rules govern these transactions.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, there are also a lot of rules that depend on things like size or market power. They are simply unnecessary, or even counterproductive, when applied to non-dominant firms. If a local bank goes under, or otherwise gets into trouble, that\u2019s obviously a problem for the local community. But if a giant bank goes under, it can threaten the health of the economy as a whole. As my colleague John Bergmayer explained at greater length in his white<\/a> paper<\/a> on digital platforms and due process, we have a long history of applying special obligations to dominant firms.<\/p>\n

Differentiating regulation between dominant and non-dominant firms particularly makes sense in industries that have a natural tendency towards concentration. From a consumer protection standpoint, dealings with a dominant firm are likely to be far more regular and consequential than with a non-dominant rival. On the competition side, we need regulation to counteract the specific economic forces in the sector that create the natural tendency towards concentration and the endurance of market power once achieved.<\/p>\n

Defining \u201cDominant\u201d Is Generally Tricky, and It\u2019s Especially Difficult in the World of Digital Platforms.<\/strong><\/p>\n

As Bergmayer also pointed out in his white<\/a> paper<\/a>, there is no generally accepted definition of what \u201cdominance\u201d means. Just as regulators struggled with \u201chow big is too big to fail\u201d after the financial crisis 10 years ago, regulators and antitrust enforcers have repeatedly struggled with the question of what makes a firm \u201cdominant\u201d or \u201cnon-dominant.\u201d In the past, regulators and antitrust enforcers have looked to things like \u201cmarket share,\u201d or \u201cincumbency,\u201d or being a \u201ccritical buyer,\u201d or some other indicia of the ability to exert control over the behavior of others contrary to how we might otherwise expect them to behave in a competitive market. Sometimes, as with too big to fail, regulators look to balance the cost of regulation against the potential risk to the sector or economy as a whole.<\/p>\n

Even if we could settle on a specific metric, what constitutes dominant is subject to considerable debate. At one time, antitrust law established a presumption that any entity with 30 percent market share would be considered \u201cdominant.\u201d This presumption, called the Philadelphia National Bank presumption<\/a>,<\/a> for the antitrust case that established it<\/a>, is inconsistently applied in the U.S., but But 30 percent market share is still generally used in Europe for creating a rebuttable presumption of market power. The Federal Communications Commission declared AT&T a non-dominant long-distance carrier despite a 60<\/a> percent<\/a> market share<\/a>. On the other hand, in FTC v. Toys R Us<\/em><\/a>, the court found that TRU had sufficient market power to support an antitrust enforcement action at 20 percent market share. What actual market share constitutes dominance varies depending on multiple factors including, but not limited to, the nature of the market, the purpose of the analysis, elasticity of demand, ease of entry, and possibly phases of the moon.<\/p>\n

Furthermore, for reasons discussed at considerable length in my first<\/a> and second<\/a> previous blog posts, traditional economic measures of dominance and market power are particularly difficult to apply to digital platforms. It is a characteristic of these firms that they achieve dominance by a breadth and depth of services that makes traditional market definition and identification of actual or potential competitors challenging. In addition, because digital platforms have varied and novel business models, traditional tools of economic analysis have struggled to identify an appropriate approach to digital platforms, let alone create consensus around how to define market power or dominance among online platforms.<\/p>\n

One of the advantages of sector-specific regulation over antitrust, however, is that we do not need to limit our concerns to firms considered dominant under classic antitrust analysis. Our touchstone lies in our overarching concern to promote the public interest with regard to the specific facts of the industry. As identified in my previous blog posts, our primary concerns are protecting consumers from harm, promoting the production and dissemination of news and differing perspectives in the marketplace of ideas, facilitating civic engagement and access to services, promoting competition, and public safety. These goals are consistent with both the fundamental values that have driven communications policy throughout U.S. history and with the public interest goals of the last century in regulating electronic media (see 47 U.S.C. \u00a7 257(b)<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Cost of Exclusion From the Platform Is the Appropriate Metric.<\/strong><\/p>\n

One of the elements of network effects is that the network becomes<\/a> more valuable to everyone on it when more people use it. The inverse is equally true. The larger the network, the greater the cost of exclusion from the network.<\/p>\n

Consider as an example the traditional evolution of unregulated interconnection regimes from the telecom and internet transit worlds. Initially, no network is dominant, and so carriers have incentive to exchange traffic for free. Everyone needs everyone else and derives roughly equal value from interconnection. As some firms grow faster than others, the larger networks are much more valuable. Smaller carriers suffer much more from the inability to interconnect with larger carriers than larger carriers suffer from the inability to interconnect with smaller carriers. Larger carriers are therefore able to demand payment from smaller networks for reaching the customers on their larger networks. If the cycle continues and the size disparity increases, it becomes increasingly easier for the larger network to offer value to customers without the smaller network, and harder for the smaller network to offer value to customers without the larger network. In an extreme case, such as AT&T\u2019s control over the \u201clong lines<\/a>\u201d (national long-distance lines) at the beginning of the 20th Century, this network dynamic can create a monopoly.<\/p>\n

But one does not need extreme cases to see how the cost of exclusion from the platform can allow a provider to drive up prices on either side of the platform, or both simultaneously. Consider credit cards. As merchants testified in the Department of Justice antitrust action against American Express, merchants felt they would suffer significant losses if they did not accede to Amex\u2019s demands \u2013 even though Amex has an approximate 25 percent market share of credit card transactions in the United States. (The Supreme Court found for Amex<\/a> on the theory that Amex\u2019s contractual demands benefited consumers (albeit at the cost of merchants), but this should not obscure the larger point that the district court found that merchants felt they would suffer significantly from being excluded from the Amex network.)<\/p>\n

COE Is Extremely Flexible and Focuses on the Central Reason Why We Care About Dominance.<\/strong><\/p>\n

An advantage of using COE is that it encompasses a wide range of potential costs and potential actors, while avoiding the arbitrary definitions that have plagued traditional efforts to determine market dominance. For example, it is clear that COE includes the loss of a substantial market for producers of goods and services, or loss of an important distribution network. At the same time, however, it takes into account the loss to consumers from being excluded from a specific platform. For example, whether or not we consider Twitter \u201cdominant\u201d in a traditional economic sense, it is clear that a business excluded from Twitter experiences some cost from its inability to communicate with Twitter subscribers. These costs include more than those associated with traditional advertising or direct sales: Companies use Twitter to respond to real-time events such as a blackout during the Superbowl<\/a> or a Tweet from a celebrity<\/a>, and companies monitor social media to address concerns and respond to criticism. These benefits won\u2019t necessarily make or break a business, but loss of access to the platform would certainly carry the significant cost of losing a valuable channel of communication with the public.<\/p>\n

We can equally apply this analysis to Twitter subscribers. In a case involving President Trump blocking critics from his Twitter feed<\/a>, the district court observed that blocking the individuals in question deprived them of the ability to interact directly with the President\u2019s statements, denying them the ability to engage in important and timely political discourse. Greg Norcie and L. Jean Camp have written an analysis<\/a> examining the costs of abstaining from social media generally. As they demonstrate, exclusion from social media platforms can have significant costs to the individual that traditional metrics for measuring dominance do not address.<\/p>\n

As an additional benefit, using COE directly addresses the reason we want to distinguish dominant platforms from non-dominant platforms in this context. Where the cost of exclusion is small, we are unlikely to have any particular concern about the practices of the platform distinct from whatever general concerns we may have about platforms more broadly.<\/p>\n

It is important to note that COE does not tell what regulation to use, but rather what to regulate. Once COE shows us that a firm is dominant, that may indicate a need for some kind of action that only addresses this dominance indirectly. For example, if we determine that a platform such as Google is dominant and that the key to that dominance is high market share search, the remedy might involve actions to stimulate competition rather than directly regulating how Google manages its search engine. By contrast, if the primary harm in being excluded from Twitter is the more limited harm of losing one of several important conduits of reaching customers, the necessary regulation may be limited to an explanation and right to challenge arbitrary exclusion as suggested by Bergmayer in \u201cEven <\/a>U<\/a>nder Kind Masters<\/a>.\u201d Again, context matters enormously.<\/p>\n

Finally, while the COE is the measure of dominance, that does not mean that exclusion is the only harm. Rather, COE works as a measure of dominance in this context because if the platform imposes some new rule or cost on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, the platform participant must decide whether the cost of acceptance outweighs the cost of abandoning the platform.<\/p>\n

Finally, I stress that simply because exclusion may impose costs — perhaps substantial costs — that does not mean that exclusion is never permissible. Indeed, in many cases it may be warranted. Even public utilities, services so essential that we consider it the responsibility of government to make them accessible to everyone, have circumstances when they may terminate service. For example, although public utilities generally must provide customers with significant grace periods for late payments, and may have lengthy procedures to prevent consumers from being cut off, a utility may ultimately refuse to serve a customer who does not pay. The telephone network is a common carrier network, but it may refuse to allow a customer to connect a device that will do damage to the network.<\/p>\n

Similarly, there may well be circumstances where dominant platforms can (or arguably even should) exclude certain kinds of speech or certain types of businesses or products. Again, the point of using COE to measure dominance is not to ensure that users of platforms never experience costs. The point of using COE as a proxy for dominance is to determine when the (potential) behavior of a digital platform potentially threatens the public interest. Determining what regulation, if any, is needed is an entirely separate exercise. Now that we have determined what sort of entities we are talking about, and the circumstances under which regulation may be appropriate, we are finally prepared to explore what about these platforms we may need to address to protect the public interest.<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

Regulaci\u00f3n de plataformas \u2013 Tercera parte: El costo de exclusi\u00f3n como medidor del dominio en la regulaci\u00f3n de las plataformas digitales<\/strong><\/p>\n

Serie sobre regulaci\u00f3n de plataformas<\/a><\/p>\n

Esta es la tercera publicaci\u00f3n de la serie sobre la regulaci\u00f3n de las plataformas digitales.<\/em><\/p>\n

En la \u00faltima publicaci\u00f3n<\/a>, brind\u00e9 una definici\u00f3n pr\u00e1ctica de lo que representa una \u00abplataforma digital\u00bb. En esta tercera publicaci\u00f3n, me concentrar\u00e9 en otro concepto que se usa muy a la ligera: \u00abdominante\u00bb. Si bien muchas regulaciones que promueven la protecci\u00f3n al consumidor y la competencia se aplican a todo un sector, algunas regulaciones econ\u00f3micas rigen solamente para firmas \u00abdominantes\u00bb o con \u00abpoder en el mercado\u00bb. El comportamiento inocuo o potencialmente positivo llevado a cabo por parte de empresas m\u00e1s peque\u00f1as o en un mercado m\u00e1s competitivo puede ser anticompetitivo o da\u00f1ino para los consumidores cuando se lleva a cabo por parte de firmas dominantes \u2014independientemente de las intenciones reales de la firma.<\/p>\n

Debido a las razones que describ\u00ed en las\u00a0publicaciones anterior<\/a>es<\/u>, definir qu\u00e9 significa \u00abdominante\u00bb (o incluso identificar un mercado en el que tomar semejante decisi\u00f3n), presenta muchos desaf\u00edos si usamos las herramientas de an\u00e1lisis tradicionales favorecidas por las autoridades de aplicaci\u00f3n y regulaci\u00f3n de la ley antimonopolio. Por lo tanto, propongo que usemos el costo de exclusi\u00f3n (\u00abCOE\u00bb, porque nada en pol\u00edtica se toma en serio hasta que tiene su propio acr\u00f3nimo) para determinar cu\u00e1ndo es necesario aplicar la regulaci\u00f3n a firmas \u00abdominantes\u00bb. Es decir, a mayor costo para los individuos y las firmas (ya sea como consumidores o productores o cualquiera de los otros roles que se pueden cumplir en las plataformas digitales), mayor ser\u00e1 la necesidad de contar con regulaciones para proteger a los usuarios de esas plataformas. Si una plataforma es tan grande que uno no se puede dar el lujo de perder el acceso a ella, entonces esa firma debe considerarse dominante.<\/p>\n

\u00bfCu\u00e1ndo distinguimos entre la regulaci\u00f3n para el sector en general y la regulaci\u00f3n para firmas dominantes?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Debemos reconocer, desde el principio, que \u2014a pesar de la insistencia de algunos de mis hom\u00f3logos liberales\u2014 no regulamos solamente para lidiar con las fallas o el poder en el mercado. M\u00e1s bien, cuando un negocio se vuelve importante para nuestro bienestar econ\u00f3mico o social, tal negocio exige alg\u00fan nivel de supervisi\u00f3n para asegurar que todos los miembros del p\u00fablico reciban un trato justo y que los problemas inesperados o imprevistos no provoquen alteraciones significativas en el comercio. Adem\u00e1s, podemos tener otros objetivos de pol\u00edticas p\u00fablicas, como la seguridad p\u00fablica, que precisen ser regulados.<\/p>\n

Sin embargo, las regulaciones no son binarias. No es una cuesti\u00f3n de s\u00ed\/no. Algunas regulaciones deben ser aplicadas siempre. Por ejemplo, aplicamos el c\u00f3digo de sanidad en todos los restaurantes, no importa cu\u00e1n peque\u00f1os sean. Y, por supuesto, eso s\u00ed incrementa el costo de hacer negocios, pero como una persona puede intoxicarse tanto en restaurante peque\u00f1o como en Chipotle, como sociedad hemos decidido que vale la pena instaurar dicho c\u00f3digo. Asimismo, si dejo mi dinero en el banco, o pido un pr\u00e9stamo para comprar un auto o una casa, contar con algunas normas b\u00e1sicas que rigen qu\u00e9 tipo de instituciones pueden hacerlo y qu\u00e9 normas por defecto rigen estas transacciones facilita el comercio y a su vez protege a los consumidores.<\/p>\n

Por otro lado, tambi\u00e9n hay normas que dependen de factores como el tama\u00f1o o el poder en el mercado. Estas normas son simplemente innecesarias, o incluso contraproducentes, cuando las aplicamos a firmas que no son dominantes. Que un banco local fracase, o tenga problemas, representa claramente un problema para la comunidad local, pero el fracaso de un banco importante puede amenazar el bienestar de la econom\u00eda entera. Como explic\u00f3 mi colega, John Bergmayer, m\u00e1s detalladamente en su\u00a0libro<\/a>\u00a0blanco<\/a>\u00a0sobre plataformas digitales y el debido proceso, llevamos mucho tiempo aplicando obligaciones especiales para firmas dominantes.<\/p>\n

Diferenciar la regulaci\u00f3n para firmas dominantes y las que no lo son tiene sentido particularmente en las industrias que son, por naturaleza, propensas a la concentraci\u00f3n. Desde el punto de vista de la protecci\u00f3n al consumidor, los tr\u00e1mites que se realicen con una firma dominante tienden a ser mucho m\u00e1s frecuentes y significativos que con rivales no dominantes. Del lado de la competencia, es necesario que la regulaci\u00f3n contrarreste las fuerzas econ\u00f3micas en el sector que crean la tendencia natural a la concentraci\u00f3n y la perdurabilidad del poder en el mercado una vez que ya fue conseguido.<\/p>\n

En general, definir a los \u00abdominantes\u00bb es complicado, especialmente en el mundo de las plataformas digitales<\/strong><\/p>\n

Como Bergmayer se\u00f1al\u00f3 en su\u00a0libro<\/a>\u00a0blanco<\/a>, no hay una definici\u00f3n ampliamente aceptada para el t\u00e9rmino \u00abdominante\u00bb. Al igual que hace diez a\u00f1os, durante la crisis financiera, las autoridades de regulaci\u00f3n lidiaron con la premisa de \u00abcu\u00e1n grande debe ser una empresa para no fracasar\u00bb, los legisladores y aplicadores de la ley antimonopolio han tenido que lidiar con la pregunta \u00ab\u00bfQu\u00e9 hace que una firma sea dominante o no dominante?\u00bb.<\/p>\n

Anteriormente, los reguladores y los aplicadores de la ley antimonopolio se concentraban en \u00abla participaci\u00f3n de mercado\u00bb, o \u00abla incumbencia\u00bb, o \u00ablos compradores cr\u00edticos\u00bb, o alg\u00fan otro indicio de la capacidad de ejercer control en el comportamiento de otros, contrario a lo que podemos esperar de su comportamiento en un mercado competitivo. A menudo, como sucedi\u00f3 con la premisa \u00ablo suficientemente grande como para no fracasar\u00bb, los reguladores buscan equilibrar el costo de regulaci\u00f3n con el riesgo potencial para el sector o la econom\u00eda en general.<\/p>\n

Incluso si nos ponemos de acuerdo en una medida espec\u00edfica, qu\u00e9 representa una firma \u00abdominante\u00bb es objeto de debate. En cierto momento, la ley antimonopolio estableci\u00f3 la suposici\u00f3n de que cualquier entidad con un 30 por ciento de participaci\u00f3n de mercado ser\u00eda considerada \u00abdominante\u00bb. Esta suposici\u00f3n, llamada la\u00a0suposici\u00f3n del Banco Nacional de Filadelfia<\/a>,<\/a>\u00a0por el caso antimonopolio que la estableci\u00f3<\/a>, se aplica de manera inconsistente en EE. UU., pero el 30 por ciento de la participaci\u00f3n de mercado todav\u00eda se usa en Europa para crear una suposici\u00f3n refutable de poder en el mercado. La Comisi\u00f3n Federal de Comunicaciones declar\u00f3 que\u00a0AT&T es un proveedor de larga distancia no dominante, a pesar de contar con un 60<\/a>\u00a0por ciento<\/a>\u00a0de participaci\u00f3n de mercado<\/a>. Por otro lado, en el caso\u00a0FTC vs. Toys \u201cR\u201d Us<\/em><\/a>, el tribunal consider\u00f3 que Toys \u201cR\u201d Us<\/em> ten\u00eda un suficiente poder en el mercado para aguantar una medida antimonopolio con solamente un 20 por ciento de participaci\u00f3n de mercado. El porcentaje de participaci\u00f3n de mercado que realmente representa el dominio var\u00eda a causa de m\u00faltiples factores, que incluyen, pero no se limitan, a la naturaleza del mercado, el prop\u00f3sito del an\u00e1lisis, la elasticidad de la demanda, la facilidad de entrada, y posiblemente las fases lunares.<\/p>\n

Adem\u00e1s, debido a las razones descriptas detalladamente en la\u00a0primera<\/a>\u00a0y en la\u00a0segunda<\/a> publicaci\u00f3n de esta serie, las medidas econ\u00f3micas tradicionales de dominio y poder en el mercado son especialmente dif\u00edciles de aplicar en las plataformas digitales. Estas firmas se caracterizan por haber logrado dominar el mercado gracias a un abanico y una amplitud de servicios que hace desafiante, en base al mercado tradicional, la definici\u00f3n e identificaci\u00f3n de posibles y reales competidores. Adicionalmente, ya que las plataformas digitales cuentan con modelos de negocios variados y novedosos, a las herramientas tradicionales de an\u00e1lisis econ\u00f3mico les fue dif\u00edcil tratar de identificar el enfoque correcto para las plataformas digitales, y m\u00e1s a\u00fan al momento de llegar a un consenso sobre c\u00f3mo definir el poder en el mercado o el dominio entre las plataformas en l\u00ednea.<\/p>\n

Una de las ventajas de la regulaci\u00f3n para sectores espec\u00edficos en comparaci\u00f3n con la ley antimonopolio, sin embargo, es que no necesitamos limitar nuestras preocupaciones a las firmas que se consideran dominantes bajo el an\u00e1lisis antimonop\u00f3lico cl\u00e1sico. La piedra angular yace en nuestra preocupaci\u00f3n general de promover el inter\u00e9s p\u00fablico con respecto a los hechos espec\u00edficos de la industria. En las publicaciones anteriores, definimos nuestras preocupaciones principales: la protecci\u00f3n al consumidor, la promoci\u00f3n de la producci\u00f3n y la diseminaci\u00f3n de noticias y de distintas perspectivas en el mercado de las ideas, la facilitaci\u00f3n de la participaci\u00f3n c\u00edvica y el acceso a servicios, el incentivo de la competencia, y la seguridad p\u00fablica. Estos objetivos se condicen tanto con los valores fundamentales que han regido las pol\u00edticas de comunicaciones en la historia de EE. UU., como con los objetivos de inter\u00e9s p\u00fablico del \u00faltimo siglo en las regulaciones de los medios electr\u00f3nicos (vea\u00a0la secci\u00f3n 47, art\u00edculo 257(b) del c\u00f3digo de EE. UU.<\/a>).<\/p>\n

El costo de exclusi\u00f3n de la plataforma es la medida adecuada<\/strong><\/p>\n

Uno de los elementos de los efectos de red es que la\u00a0red se vuelve<\/a>\u00a0m\u00e1s valiosa para todos mientras m\u00e1s gente la use. Lo contrario es igualmente cierto. Mientras m\u00e1s grande es la red, mayor es el costo de exclusi\u00f3n de ella.<\/p>\n

Tomemos como ejemplo la evoluci\u00f3n tradicional de los reg\u00edmenes de interconexi\u00f3n no regulada de los mundos de las telecomunicaciones y el tr\u00e1nsito de Internet. En un comienzo, ninguna red es dominante, entonces los proveedores tienen el incentivo de intercambiar tr\u00e1fico de manera gratuita. Todos necesitamos de todos y extraemos casi el mismo valor de cada interconexi\u00f3n. A medida que algunas firmas crecen con m\u00e1s rapidez que otras, las redes m\u00e1s grandes adquieren mucho m\u00e1s valor. Los proveedores m\u00e1s peque\u00f1os sufren mucho m\u00e1s la incapacidad de interconectarse con proveedores m\u00e1s grandes que lo que estos \u00faltimos sufren no poder conectarse con los proveedores peque\u00f1os. Los proveedores m\u00e1s grandes son capaces, por lo tanto, de exigir pagos por parte de las redes m\u00e1s peque\u00f1as por llegar a consumidores en las redes m\u00e1s grandes. Si el ciclo contin\u00faa y la desigualdad de tama\u00f1o aumenta, se vuelve m\u00e1s f\u00e1cil a\u00fan para las grandes redes ofrecer valor para los consumidores sin contar con las redes peque\u00f1as, y es m\u00e1s dif\u00edcil que estas \u00faltimas puedan ofrecer valor a los consumidores sin contar con las redes m\u00e1s grandes. En casos extremos, como el control de AT&T sobre las \u00abl\u00edneas largas<\/a>\u00bb (l\u00edneas nacionales de larga distancia) a comienzos del siglo XX, esta din\u00e1mica de red puede crear un monopolio.<\/p>\n

Pero no hace falta ver los casos extremos para darse cuenta de que el costo de exclusi\u00f3n de la plataforma puede hacer que un proveedor aumente sus precios en cualquiera de los lados de la plataforma, o en ambos a la vez. Tomemos como ejemplo a las tarjetas de cr\u00e9dito. En el Departamento de Justicia durante el proceso judicial antimonop\u00f3lico contra American Express, los comerciantes atestiguaron que sent\u00edan que sufrir\u00edan grandes p\u00e9rdidas si no cumpl\u00edan con las exigencias de Amex \u2014aunque esta empresa tiene una participaci\u00f3n de mercado de, aproximadamente, un 25 por ciento de las transacciones con tarjeta de cr\u00e9dito en EE. UU. (La\u00a0Corte Suprema fall\u00f3 a favor de Amex<\/a>,<\/u>\u00a0alegando que las exigencias contractuales de Amex eran beneficiosas para los consumidores (aunque no para los comerciantes), pero esto no deber\u00eda opacar el hecho m\u00e1s importante, en el que la corte del distrito consider\u00f3 que los comerciantes sufrir\u00edan en demas\u00eda el ser excluidos de la red de Amex).<\/p>\n

El COE es extremadamente flexible y se concentra en la raz\u00f3n principal por la que nos importa el dominio<\/strong><\/p>\n

Una ventaja de utilizar el COE es que comprende un amplio rango de costos posibles y actores posibles, mientras que evita las definiciones arbitrarias que plagaron los esfuerzos tradicionales para determinar el dominio en el mercado. Por ejemplo, queda claro que el COE incluye la p\u00e9rdida sustancial del mercado para los productores de bienes y servicios, o la p\u00e9rdida de una importante red de distribuci\u00f3n. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, tiene en cuenta la p\u00e9rdida de los consumidores al ser excluidos de una plataforma espec\u00edfica. Por ejemplo, sin importar si consideramos a Twitter \u00abdominante\u00bb o no en el sentido econ\u00f3mico tradicional, es evidente que un negocio que quede excluido de Twitter experimentar\u00e1 el precio de su incapacidad de comunicarse con los suscriptores de dicha plataforma. Estos costos son m\u00e1s altos que aquellos asociados con las publicidades tradicionales o las ventas directas: Las empresas usan Twitter para reaccionar a eventos en tiempo real como el\u00a0apag\u00f3n durante el Superbowl<\/a>\u00a0o\u00a0un tuit de una celebridad<\/u>, y monitorean las redes sociales para abordar preocupaciones y responder a cr\u00edticas. Estos beneficios no necesariamente formar\u00e1n ni destruir\u00e1n un negocio, pero la p\u00e9rdida de acceso a una plataforma ciertamente acarrea costos de p\u00e9rdida de valor significativos, ya que se pierde un canal de comunicaci\u00f3n con el p\u00fablico.<\/p>\n

Tambi\u00e9n podemos aplicar el mismo an\u00e1lisis para los suscriptores de Twitter. En un\u00a0caso en el que el presidente Trump bloque\u00f3 cr\u00edticas de su p\u00e1gina de Twitter<\/a>, la corte del distrito se\u00f1al\u00f3 que bloquear a los individuos en cuesti\u00f3n los despojaba de la capacidad de interactuar directamente con las declaraciones del presidente, priv\u00e1ndolos de la oportunidad de participar del discurso pol\u00edtico de manera oportuna. Greg Norcie y L. Jean Camp\u00a0redactaron un an\u00e1lisis<\/a>\u00a0que examin\u00f3 los costos de abstenci\u00f3n de las redes sociales en general. Demuestran que la exclusi\u00f3n de las plataformas de redes sociales puede acarrear costos significativos para los individuos que no son abordados por las medidas tradicionales que miden el dominio.<\/p>\n

Usar el COE tiene el beneficio adicional de abordar directamente la raz\u00f3n por la que queremos distinguir las plataformas dominantes de las que no lo son en este contexto. Si el costo de exclusi\u00f3n es bajo, es improbable que surjan preocupaciones especiales sobre las pr\u00e1cticas de la plataforma que sean distintas a las preocupaciones generales que podemos experimentar con las plataformas en el sentido m\u00e1s amplio.<\/p>\n

Cabe destacar que el COE no indica cu\u00e1l regulaci\u00f3n aplicar, sino qu\u00e9 debemos regular. Una vez que el COE demuestra que una firma es dominante, eso nos puede se\u00f1alar la necesidad de tomar medidas que solo aborden ese dominio de manera indirecta. Por ejemplo, si determinamos que una plataforma como Google es dominante y que la clave de su dominio es la alta participaci\u00f3n de mercado de b\u00fasquedas, el remedio puede incluir acciones para estimular la competencia, en lugar de regular directamente la manera en que Google maneja su motor de b\u00fasqueda. En cambio, si el da\u00f1o principal al ser excluido de Twitter es el da\u00f1o limitado de perder uno de tantos canales importantes para llegar a los consumidores, la regulaci\u00f3n que se necesita puede limitarse a una explicaci\u00f3n y el derecho de impugnar la exclusi\u00f3n arbitraria, como lo sugiere Bergmayer en Even\u00a0<\/em><\/a>U<\/em><\/a>nder Kind Masters<\/em><\/a>. Una vez m\u00e1s, el contexto es de extrema importancia.<\/p>\n

Finalmente, que el COE mida el dominio no quiere decir que la exclusi\u00f3n sea el \u00fanico perjuicio. M\u00e1s bien, el COE funciona como una vara de medici\u00f3n del dominio en este contexto porque, si la plataforma impone alguna nueva regla o costo del tipo \u00abt\u00f3malo o d\u00e9jalo\u00bb, el participante de la plataforma debe decidir si el costo de aceptaci\u00f3n es mayor que el costo de abandono de la plataforma.<\/p>\n

Finalmente, cabe destacar que el hecho de que la exclusi\u00f3n pueda imponer costos \u2014quiz\u00e1s sustanciales\u2014 no quiere decir que esa exclusi\u00f3n no sea permisible. De hecho, en muchos casos puede ser justificada. Hasta en los servicios p\u00fablicos \u2014servicios que son tan esenciales que el gobierno debe encargarse de ponerlos a disposici\u00f3n de todos\u2014 hay circunstancias en las que el servicio puede interrumpirse. Por ejemplo, si bien los servicios p\u00fablicos generalmente deben brindar a los clientes periodos de gracia para los pagos atrasados, y quiz\u00e1s soportar procesos largos para evitar cortar el servicio a los consumidores, un proveedor puede, en \u00faltima instancia, rehusarse a brindar el servicio a un cliente deudor. \u00a0La red telef\u00f3nica es una red common carrier<\/em>, pero puede rehusarse a que el cliente conecte un dispositivo que pueda da\u00f1ar la red.<\/p>\n

Tambi\u00e9n pueden existir situaciones en las que las plataformas dominantes puedan (o, quiz\u00e1s, deban) excluir ciertos tipos de discursos, negocios o productos. Una vez m\u00e1s, el prop\u00f3sito de utilizar el COE para medir el dominio no asegura que los usuarios de las plataformas queden exentos de experimentar costos. El prop\u00f3sito de usar el COE como un medidor de dominio es determinar cu\u00e1ndo el (potencial) comportamiento de una plataforma puede representar una amenaza para el inter\u00e9s p\u00fablico. Determinar qu\u00e9 regulaci\u00f3n \u2014de ser necesaria alguna\u2014 es la correcta es una cuesti\u00f3n totalmente diferente. Ahora que ya hemos determinado a qu\u00e9 tipos de entidades nos referimos y las circunstancias en las que la regulaci\u00f3n puede ser adecuada, estamos preparados para explorar qu\u00e9 aspectos de las plataformas debemos abordar para proteger el inter\u00e9s p\u00fablico.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In my last blog post, I explained my working definition for what constitutes a \u201cdigital platform.\u201d Today, I focus on another concept that gets thrown around a lot: \u201cdominant.\u201d While many regulations promoting consumer protection and competition apply throughout a sector, some economic regulations apply to \u201cdominant\u201d firms or firms with \u201cmarket power.\u201d Behavior that is harmless, or potentially even positive when done by smaller companies or in a more competitive marketplace, can be anticompetitive or harmful to consumers when done by dominant firms — regardless of the firm\u2019s actual intent.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-10024","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-insights"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nPart III: Cost of Exclusion as a Proxy for Dominance in Digital Platform Regulation - Public Knowledge<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Public Knowledge promotes freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to affordable communications tools and creative works. 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