{"id":11120,"date":"2018-07-17T14:09:00","date_gmt":"2018-07-17T18:09:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.publicknowledge.org\/uncategorized\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/"},"modified":"2018-07-17T14:09:00","modified_gmt":"2018-07-17T18:09:00","slug":"platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/","title":{"rendered":"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is the first blog post in a series on regulating digital platforms.\u00a0You can view the full series <\/span>here<\/a>.\u00a0<\/span>Haz clic\u00a0aqu\u00ed<\/a>\u00a0para leer en espa\u00f1ol.<\/span><\/em><\/p>\n

As digital platforms have become increasingly important in our everyday lives, we\u2019ve recognized that the need for some sort of regulatory oversight increases. In the past, we\u2019ve talked about this in the context of privacy<\/a> and what general sorts of due process rights dominant platforms owe their customers<\/a>. Today, we make it clear that we have reached the point where we need sector-specific regulation focused on online digital platforms, not just application of existing antitrust or existing consumer protection laws. When platforms have become so central to our lives that a change in algorithm can dramatically crash third-party businesses<\/a>, when social media plays such an important role in our lives that entire businesses exist to pump up your follower numbers<\/a>, and when a multi-billion dollar industry exists for the sole purpose of helping businesses game search engine rankings<\/a>, lawmakers need to stop talking hopefully about self-regulation and start putting in place enforceable rights to protect the public interest.<\/p>\n

That said, we need to recognize at the outset that a lot of things make it rather challenging to\u00a0 figure out what kind of regulation actually makes sense in this space. Although Ecclesiastes assures us \u201cthere is nothing new under the sun,\u201d digital platforms combine issues we\u2019ve dealt with in electronic media (and elsewhere) in novel ways that make applying traditional solutions tricky. Before diving into the solution, therefore, we need to (a) define the problem, and (b) decide what kind of outcome we want to see.<\/p>\n

As Jean Tirole, the economist who won the Nobel Prize for defining two-sided markets, pointed out in this interview<\/a>, unless you know what you\u2019re doing and trying to accomplish, you can\u2019t really know if you are addressing your concerns. Breaking up Facebook won\u2019t solve the privacy problems, for example. Nor is it clear how you could prevent \u201cbaby Facebooks\u201d or \u201cbaby Googles\u201d from simply re-establishing their market dominance if we don\u2019t have a clear understanding of the mechanisms of how they work. When we broke up AT&T, we could easily define the essential facility to be regulated (local networks) and separate out the market segments where we could have competition (e.g., long distance, \u201celectronic publishing,\u201d equipment manufacture). If Google\u2019s big advantage is \u201csearch,\u201d how exactly do you break that up? What is Facebook\u2019s market anyway?<\/p>\n

It\u2019s not that these questions don\u2019t have answers. They do. But the big problem in Policyland is that people know what they don\u2019t like and try to get rid of that one piece. This usually works about as well as Canute ordering back the tide<\/a>. So before talking about solutions, or leaping into a debate over whether the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, or some hypothetical new agency should have jurisdiction, let me run through some of the factors that we need to navigate.<\/p>\n

What Exactly Is a \u201cDigital Platform\u201d Anyway? How Are They Different From Anything Else?<\/strong><\/p>\n

When we do sector-specific regulation (like telecommunications), we at least have some idea of what we are talking about, even if it is pretty broad. Section 1 of the Communications Act establishes the FCC to regulate \u201cinterstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire or radio.\u201d Right away, I know I\u2019m talking about the business of communication via electronic means. I\u2019ve excluded heliographs and letters, and included a broad array of things from AM Radio to (until recently<\/a>) broadband. This wildly divergent set of technologies all have one essential element in common — they deal with the critical human activity of communications. Likewise, the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act creating the Food and Drug Administration may cover an awful lot of territory, but I can define fairly easily what is a food, what is a drug, or what is a cosmetic. Yes, there will always be fun edge cases (e.g., Are cigarettes a drug delivery system?), but for the most part we have a pretty good idea what we mean.<\/p>\n

Now we come to digital platforms. Generally, people know what they definitely want covered: Google, Facebook, Amazon, and maybe Twitter. What about Cloudflare? Reddit? Netflix? That stupid app that only said \u201cyo\u201d<\/a>? Did Yo change into a platform once it expanded to let you attach links and things? Why or why not?<\/p>\n

It\u2019s not enough to say \u201cGoogle, we hates it precious<\/a>!\u201d We need to articulate exactly what it is we are trying to cover. Which brings us to the next problem.<\/p>\n

A Digital Platform Is Like an Elephant, Which Is Like a Snake, or a Rope, or Something.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Intertwined with the question of what makes a digital platform is figuring out what these platforms do. When Lindsey Graham and Mark Zuckerberg sparred over whether or not Facebook had competitors<\/a>, they each had a point. Zuckerberg argued that what Facebook does overlaps with a lot of different companies, but Graham pointed out that Facebook is unique in offering a service that combines a whole bunch of different functionalities. But the question goes deeper than market definitions. It goes to the goals we set for public policy.<\/p>\n

Traditionally, we could neatly divide activities into lines of business and determine what sort of policies would most likely promote the common good. For example, in the Communications Act, we generally had one set of public interest obligations associated with telecommunications and a different set for media. Certainly, we had (and continue to have) some overlap. We broadly care about competition and public safety in both telecommunications and mass media, for example. But traditionally, we have focused telecommunications policy on our five fundamental values<\/a> of universal service, competition, consumer protection, network reliability, and public safety.<\/p>\n

By contrast, we have focused our media policy on promoting diverse sources of news and perspectives as critical to enabling our democratic system of government to function. We treat telecommunications as infrastructure and a public utility, spending billions of dollars to ensure that everyone in the country has affordable access. We have no policy of making sure that everyone has access to a cable or satellite provider — despite the important news and public safety content they provide.<\/p>\n

These differences inform the kind of regulation we impose to further our public policy goals. We have strict no interference\/common carriage requirements on telecommunications. No one demands that mobile phone providers monitor the phone calls of everyone using their phone networks to block hate speech. No one has argued that Comcast or AT&T should cancel the phone service of Nazis. In fact, we have laws in place precisely to prevent<\/em> such things. In exchange, we immunize common carriers from any liability for content of their customers\u2019 speech. Again, no one proposes that Verizon Wireless should be liable for sex traffickers, or that Sprint should ensure that Russians trying to manipulate our elections don\u2019t send texts.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, we explicitly prohibit treating broadcasters (or cable operators) as common carriers. But we make them liable for their editorial choices and require them to promote certain social policies such as providing educational material to children<\/a> (and protecting them from \u2018indecent\u2019 content<\/a>). We require broadcasters and cable operators to disclose when programming material is sponsored<\/a>. We prohibit them from selling advertising to one political party\u2019s federal candidates<\/a>,<\/a> but not others<\/a>. And — at least <\/a>until recently<\/a> — we have sought to promote diversity of viewpoints by setting ownership limits well below those considered dangerous under antitrust law. To quote the departing Justice Kennedy<\/a>: \u201cFederal policy, however, has long favored preserving a multiplicity of broadcast outlets regardless of whether the conduct that threatens it is motivated by anticompetitive animus or rises to the level of an antitrust violation.\u201d<\/p>\n

Digital platforms, depending on how broadly we define them, share elements of both straight-up telecommunications and mass media — as well as qualities not found in either. These platforms often combine both the one-to-one aspect of traditional telecommunications with the potentially vast reach of mass media. Even the largest conference call Public Knowledge could host is trivial compared to the number of people who could theoretically access this blog post (insert joke about our blog being one-to-one because we have so few readers here). But digital platforms add a new element in the mix by giving me access to other content through linking. Platforms may enable organizing — for positive or negative purposes — in ways that neither traditional telecommunications nor traditional media could make possible.<\/p>\n

But it gets even more complicated when we consider the vast array of other functions performed by online platforms that we instinctively group together. Is Amazon a retailer? A shopping mall for third-party vendors? All of the above? Video sharing sites and other platforms for exchanging content look more like public storage cubes than broadcasters in that they simply are a repository for someone else\u2019s stuff. But we increasingly relate to them in the same way that we have related to traditional mass media. Sometimes. But other times not.<\/p>\n

Balancing Policy Objectives Makes for Messy Tradeoffs.<\/strong><\/p>\n

Finally, we need to recognize that regulating platforms ultimately means a bunch of trade-offs. Everyone hates this. Everyone loves to talk about policy options as if my<\/em> proposal is a stairway to heaven, and all other options are handcarts heading down the road paved with good intentions. Everyone wants to talk about this as \u201ccurbing greedy corporations\u201d or \u201cprotecting innovation and free expression from ravening Socialists.\u201d And, to be fair, sometimes the answers are pretty obvious. We can all agree that free speech survives just fine under laws that prevent false or deceptive advertising. But most times, we are talking about balancing trade-offs and looking to maximize the probability of good results while minimizing the possibility of bad results.<\/p>\n

To take just one obvious example, it is impossible to have social media platforms operate as common carriers while simultaneously policing their networks for hate speech. But that doesn\u2019t mean our choices are binary. Somewhere between blocking a quote from the Declaration of Independence<\/a> and helplessly standing by while hate groups organize online harassment campaigns lies some trade-off that protects most (but invariably not all) controversial speech while simultaneously preventing most (but not all) online harassment.<\/p>\n

But then we have trade-offs that are more economic or technical in nature. Take the question of \u201csearch neutrality.\u201d The entire point<\/em> of a search engine is to help organize things in useful ways. A search engine can\u2019t be \u201cneutral\u201d in the same way a broadband network can be \u201cneutral\u201d because I don\u2019t need my broadband provider to recommend websites or applications. But my typing \u201cmanage student loans without sobbing hysterically\u201d into a search engine requires it to recommend websites or applications relevant to my request — in fact, presenting this information is exactly<\/em> what I\u2019m asking the search engine to do.<\/p>\n

At the same time, however, we can recognize how controlling internet search — whether by developing the algorithms of search engines or otherwise selecting for or discriminating against specific types of results, such as favoring affiliated content or discriminating against rival content or unpopular speech — has enormous implications for competition, as well as for other social policies. When we expand \u201csearch\u201d to mean any sort of ordering and recommendation, such as how Facebook presents things in my timeline or how Amazon recommends products, we discover a new set of problems. Setting aside things we obviously want to disallow, such as secret experiments to manipulate our emotions<\/a>, the very thing that makes it most effective can have negative social consequences. For example, should YouTube suggest related videos based on its algorithm when those videos lead to increasing radicalization<\/a>? Should Facebook continue to show related news items, despite the fact that this re-enforces the \u201cbubble effect\u201d that many say is fragmenting our society? Should we make systems more annoying and less efficient in order to prevent addiction by design<\/a>?<\/p>\n

Hard but Necessary.<\/strong><\/p>\n

This is the point where the industry lobby and those ideologically opposed to regulation usually leap in and start talking about \u201cregulatory humility\u201d and \u201cunintended consequences\u201d and \u201cfirst do no harm.\u201d The problem is, to add to the clich\u00e9 storm, \u201crefusal to act is<\/em> an action.\u201d We are living in a world rapidly devolving into a set of highly concentrated digital platforms around which major aspects of our economy and our lives revolve. As the CEO of Cloudflare, Matthew Prince, eloquently put it<\/a> after terminating service to Nazi Organization\/Publication Der Stormer<\/em>: \u201cIn a not-so-distant future, if we’re not there already, it may be that if you’re going to put content on the internet you’ll need to use a company with a giant network like Cloudflare, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Amazon, or Alibaba.\u201d Or, somewhat more directly<\/a>: \u201cLiterally, I woke up in a bad mood and decided someone shouldn\u2019t be allowed on the internet. No one should have that power.\u201d<\/p>\n

Prince was talking specifically about policing speech, but the same is true about competition and consumer protection. No company should have the power to determine what business models are acceptable and which ones to block as potential competition. People should have confidence that protection of their privacy does not depend on the whims and best efforts of CEOs. Nor is this simply a question of size and market dominance. While the conversation until now has largely focused on the largest platforms, and while there are certainly concerns that apply only to dominant platforms, one of the critical aspects of sector-specific regulation is to identify when a public policy concern needs to apply to all providers regardless of size. For example, Reddit can in no way be considered \u201cdominant,\u201d since as measured by either subscribers or total social media traffic it does not even come close to Facebook\u2019s market share.<\/a> But if we are trying to determine the right policy for balancing content moderation vs. fears about censorship or concerns about the harm to innovation, then it doesn\u2019t matter whether we\u2019re talking about Facebook or Reddit or some fledgling service that doesn\u2019t even exist.<\/p>\n

And yes, we should acknowledge that such regulation may raise the cost of doing business — although both experience and research studies tell us that these fears are greatly exaggerated.<\/a> But, as noted above, balancing policy objectives makes for trade-offs. There is no doubt that health codes and fire safety codes raise the cost of business to emerging restaurants. It is also true that without health codes we get more cases of food poisoning and more fires. While we can, and should, debate the trade-offs and where to set the balance, the fact that a rule may impose cost is not an automatic showstopper in any rational policy discussion.<\/p>\n

In my next blog post, I will start trying to answer these questions, starting with the most basic one — what, exactly, are we talking about regulating?<\/p>\n

<\/a><\/p>\n

\n

Regulaci\u00f3n de plataformas \u2013 Primera parte: Por qu\u00e9 la regulaci\u00f3n de plataformas resulta tan necesaria como dif\u00edcil<\/strong><\/p>\n

Serie sobre regulaci\u00f3n de plataformas<\/a><\/p>\n

Esta es la primera publicaci\u00f3n de la serie sobre la regulaci\u00f3n de las plataformas digitales.<\/em><\/p>\n

Debido a que las plataformas digitales se han vuelto cada vez m\u00e1s importantes en nuestras vidas cotidianas, hemos notado que creci\u00f3 la necesidad de que exista alg\u00fan tipo de supervisi\u00f3n regulatoria. En ocasiones anteriores, hablamos sobre esto en el contexto de la\u00a0privacidad<\/a>\u00a0y, en general, sobre qu\u00e9 tipos de\u00a0derechos de debido proceso les deben a sus clientes las plataformas dominantes<\/a>. Hoy en d\u00eda, es evidente que llegamos a un punto en el que necesitamos una regulaci\u00f3n espec\u00edfica para el sector, concentrada en las plataformas digitales en l\u00ednea, y no solo la aplicaci\u00f3n de las leyes antimonopolio y de protecci\u00f3n al consumidor ya existentes. Vivimos en un momento en el que las plataformas ocupan un lugar tan central en nuestras rutinas que un\u00a0cambio de algoritmo puede destrozar dr\u00e1sticamente el negocio de un tercero<\/a>, en el que las redes sociales juegan un rol tan importante en nuestras vidas\u00a0que existen empresas exclusivamente dedicadas a aumentar la cantidad de seguidores de una cuenta<\/a>, y en el que\u00a0existe una industria de miles de millones de d\u00f3lares solo con el prop\u00f3sito de ayudar a empresas en los rankings de los motores de b\u00fasqueda<\/a>. Es por esto que los legisladores deber\u00edan dejar de hablar esperanzados sobre la autorregulaci\u00f3n y comenzar a instaurar derechos aplicables para proteger el inter\u00e9s p\u00fablico.<\/p>\n

Habiendo dicho esto, debemos reconocer, en primer lugar, que muchos factores hacen que sea un desaf\u00edo saber qu\u00e9 tipo de regulaci\u00f3n tendr\u00eda sentido en este contexto. Si bien Eclesiast\u00e9s nos asegura que \u00abno hay nada nuevo bajo el sol\u00bb, las plataformas digitales combinan cuestiones en las que hemos trabajado en los medios electr\u00f3nicos (y en otros sitios) de maneras nuevas, que hacen que resulte compleja la aplicaci\u00f3n de soluciones tradicionales. Por lo tanto, antes de lanzarnos en la b\u00fasqueda de la soluci\u00f3n, necesitamos: (a) delimitar el problema, y (b) decidir qu\u00e9 tipo de resultado deseamos.<\/p>\n

Tal y como lo se\u00f1al\u00f3 en esta entrevista<\/a> Jean Tirole, el economista que gan\u00f3 el Premio Nobel por definir los mercados de dos lados, a menos que uno sepa lo que est\u00e1 haciendo y lo que intenta conseguir, uno no puede saber a ciencia cierta si est\u00e1 abordando sus preocupaciones. Disolver Facebook no resolver\u00e1 los problemas de privacidad, por ejemplo. Tampoco queda claro c\u00f3mo evitar que nuevos Facebooks o nuevos Googles reestablezcan su dominio en el mercado si no entendemos claramente c\u00f3mo funcionan. Cuando disolvimos AT&T, pudimos definir f\u00e1cilmente el servicio esencial que deb\u00eda ser regulado (las redes locales) y separar los segmentos del mercado donde pod\u00edamos tener competencia (por ejemplo, larga distancia, \u00abpublicaciones electr\u00f3nicas\u00bb, fabricaci\u00f3n de equipos). Si la gran ventaja de Google es la \u00abb\u00fasqueda\u00bb, \u00bfc\u00f3mo hacemos para disolverlo? A todo esto, \u00bfcu\u00e1l es el mercado de Facebook?<\/p>\n

No es que estas preguntas no tengan respuestas. Las tienen. Sin embargo, el gran problema en la Tierra de las Pol\u00edticas es que las personas saben qu\u00e9 no les gusta e intentan deshacerse solamente de esa parte. Por lo general, este m\u00e9todo funciona tan bien como\u00a0Canuto intentando hacer retroceder las olas<\/a>. Entonces, antes de hablar de soluciones, o meternos de lleno en un debate sobre si deber\u00eda tener jurisdicci\u00f3n la Comisi\u00f3n Federal de Comunicaciones, la Comisi\u00f3n Federal de Comercio, o alguna otra agencia hipot\u00e9tica nueva, repasemos algunos de los factores que debemos explorar.<\/p>\n

\u00bfQu\u00e9 es exactamente una \u00abplataforma digital\u00bb? \u00bfC\u00f3mo se diferencia de todo lo dem\u00e1s?<\/strong><\/p>\n

Cuando regulamos un sector espec\u00edfico (como las telecomunicaciones), al menos tenemos una idea de lo que hablamos, incluso si es bastante amplia. La primera secci\u00f3n de la Ley de Comunicaciones establece que la Comisi\u00f3n Federal de Comunicaciones (FCC, por sus siglas en ingl\u00e9s) debe regular \u00abel comercio interestatal e internacional de la comunicaci\u00f3n por cable y radio\u00bb. Sabemos de inmediato que estamos hablando del negocio de la comunicaci\u00f3n a trav\u00e9s de medios electr\u00f3nicos. Excluimos los heli\u00f3grafos y cartas, e incluimos una amplia gama de tecnolog\u00edas que van desde la radio AM hasta la banda ancha (hasta hace poco<\/a>). Este conjunto de tecnolog\u00edas extremadamente diferentes entre s\u00ed tiene un elemento en com\u00fan: todas abordan la actividad fundamental y humana de la comunicaci\u00f3n. De la misma manera, la Ley de Alimentos, Medicamentos y Cosm\u00e9ticos que crea la Administraci\u00f3n de Alimentos y Medicamentos puede cubrir un territorio incre\u00edblemente amplio, pero uno puede definir de una manera bastante f\u00e1cil qu\u00e9 es un alimento, un medicamento, o un cosm\u00e9tico. S\u00ed, siempre habr\u00e1 casos perif\u00e9ricos (por ejemplo, \u00bflos cigarrillos son un sistema de liberaci\u00f3n de drogas?), pero, a grandes rasgos, tenemos conocimientos sobre la cuesti\u00f3n.<\/p>\n

Y aqu\u00ed entran las plataformas digitales. Por lo general, las personas saben qu\u00e9 quieren que est\u00e9 cubierto a toda costa: Google, Facebook, Amazon, y quiz\u00e1s Twitter. \u00bfQu\u00e9 tal Cloudflare? \u00bfY Reddit? \u00bfNetflix?\u00a0\u00bfEsa aplicaci\u00f3n est\u00fapida que solo dec\u00eda \u00abyo\u00bb<\/a>? La aplicaci\u00f3n Yo, \u00bfse convirti\u00f3 en una plataforma cuando expandi\u00f3 sus caracter\u00edsticas y permiti\u00f3 adjuntar enlaces y otros elementos? \u00bfPor qu\u00e9? O, \u00bfpor qu\u00e9 no?<\/p>\n

No basta con decir \u00ab\u00a1Google, te odiamos por siempre<\/a>!\u00bb Debemos articular exactamente lo que queremos cubrir. Lo que nos lleva al siguiente problema.<\/p>\n

Una plataforma digital es como un elefante, que es como una serpiente, o una soga, o algo as\u00ed<\/strong><\/p>\n

Con la pregunta sobre qu\u00e9 es una plataforma digital aparece la pregunta sobre qu\u00e9 hacen estas plataformas.\u00a0Cuando Lindsey Graham y Mark Zuckerberg discutieron sobre si Facebook ten\u00eda competidores o no<\/a>, los dos tuvieron raz\u00f3n hasta cierto punto. Zuckerberg argument\u00f3 que lo que hace Facebook se superpone con muchas otras empresas diferentes, pero Graham se\u00f1al\u00f3 que Facebook es \u00fanico, ya que ofrece un servicio que combina una gran cantidad de funcionalidades diferentes. Sin embargo, la cuesti\u00f3n trasciende las definiciones del mercado: apunta a las metas que ponemos para las pol\u00edticas p\u00fablicas.<\/p>\n

Hist\u00f3ricamente, hemos podido dividir de manera clara las actividades en diferentes l\u00edneas de negocios y determinar qu\u00e9 tipo de pol\u00edticas promover\u00edan mejor el bien com\u00fan. A modo de ejemplo, en la Ley de Comunicaciones, ten\u00edamos generalmente un conjunto de obligaciones de inter\u00e9s p\u00fablico asociadas con las telecomunicaciones y otro conjunto diferente para los medios. Desde luego, hab\u00eda (y todav\u00eda hay) algunas superposiciones. Nos importa mucho la competencia y la seguridad p\u00fablica tanto en las telecomunicaciones como en los medios de comunicaci\u00f3n, por ejemplo. Sin embargo, tradicionalmente, concentramos las pol\u00edticas de telecomunicaciones en nuestros\u00a0cinco valores fundamentales<\/a>\u00a0de servicio universal, competencia, protecci\u00f3n al consumidor, fiabilidad de la red, y seguridad p\u00fablica.<\/p>\n

En cambio, en las pol\u00edticas para los medios, nos enfocamos en promover como vitales las diversas fuentes de noticias y perspectivas para habilitar el funcionamiento de nuestro sistema democr\u00e1tico de gobierno. Consideramos que las telecomunicaciones son infraestructura y un servicio p\u00fablico, e invertimos miles de millones de d\u00f3lares para asegurarnos de que todas las personas en el pa\u00eds tengan un acceso asequible a ellas. No contamos con una pol\u00edtica que garantice que todos tengan acceso a un proveedor de cable o sat\u00e9lite \u2014a pesar de que brindan noticias importantes y contenidos de seguridad p\u00fablica.<\/p>\n

Estas diferencias le dan forma al tipo de regulaci\u00f3n que imponemos para promover nuestros objetivos de pol\u00edticas p\u00fablicas. Contamos con estrictos requisitos de no interferencia\/transporte com\u00fan (common carriage<\/em>, en ingl\u00e9s) para las telecomunicaciones. Nadie exige que los proveedores de servicios de telefon\u00eda m\u00f3vil monitoreen las llamadas telef\u00f3nicas de todas las personas que utilizan sus redes telef\u00f3nicas para bloquear el discurso del odio. Nadie dice que Comcast o AT&T deber\u00edan cancelarles el servicio telef\u00f3nico a los nazis. De hecho, contamos con leyes que precisamente est\u00e1n destinadas a evitar<\/em> estas cuestiones. En cambio, inmunizamos a los common carriers<\/em> (proveedores de servicios de transporte) para que no deban responsabilizarse del contenido del discurso de sus clientes. Una vez m\u00e1s, nadie propone que Verizon Wireless tenga que ser responsable de los traficantes sexuales, o que Sprint deba asegurarse de que los rusos que intentan manipular las elecciones no env\u00eden mensajes de texto.<\/p>\n

Por otro lado, prohibimos expl\u00edcitamente que las emisoras (u operadoras de cable) reciban el mismo trato que los common carriers<\/em>. No obstante, los hacemos responsables de sus elecciones editoriales y les exigimos que promuevan ciertos tipos de pol\u00edticas sociales como\u00a0el material educativo para los ni\u00f1os<\/a>\u00a0(que a su vez\u00a0los protege de contenidos \u00abindecentes\u00bb<\/a>). Exigimos que las emisoras y las operadoras de cable\u00a0revelen cu\u00e1ndo el material de programaci\u00f3n est\u00e1 patrocinado<\/a>. Les prohibimos\u00a0vender publicidades a los candidatos federales de un partido pol\u00edtico<\/a>,<\/a>\u00a0pero no a otros<\/a>. Y \u2014al menos\u00a0<\/a>hasta hace poco<\/a>\u2014 hemos intentado promover la diversidad de opiniones imponiendo l\u00edmites de propiedad muy por debajo de los que se consideran peligrosos en la ley antimonopolio.\u00a0Para citar al saliente Juez Kennedy,<\/a>: \u00abLa pol\u00edtica federal, sin embargo, lleva tiempo favoreciendo la preservaci\u00f3n de la multiplicidad de emisoras, independientemente de si la conducta que la amenaza est\u00e1 motivada por una animosidad anticompetitiva o se eleva al nivel de una violaci\u00f3n de la ley antimonopolio\u00bb.<\/p>\n

Las plataformas digitales, dependiendo de cu\u00e1n amplia sea su definici\u00f3n, comparten elementos tanto de las telecomunicaciones como de los medios de comunicaci\u00f3n \u2014as\u00ed como tambi\u00e9n cualidades que no se encuentran en ninguna de las dos. Estas plataformas a menudo combinan el aspecto individualizado de las telecomunicaciones tradicionales con el alcance potencialmente inmenso de los medios de comunicaci\u00f3n. Hasta la teleconferencia m\u00e1s grande organizada por Public Knowledge es trivial en comparaci\u00f3n con la cantidad de personas que, te\u00f3ricamente, podr\u00edan tener acceso a esta publicaci\u00f3n (aqu\u00ed ir\u00eda una broma sobre que nuestro blog es individualizado porque tenemos muy pocos lectores en este medio). Pero las plataformas digitales a\u00f1aden un nuevo elemento a la mezcla al brindar acceso a otros contenidos mediante enlaces. Las plataformas pueden habilitar la organizaci\u00f3n \u2014con prop\u00f3sitos positivos o negativos\u2014 de maneras en que ni las telecomunicaciones ni los medios tradicionales podr\u00edan hacerlo.<\/p>\n

Pero se complica a\u00fan m\u00e1s cuando consideramos la amplia gama de otras funciones que desempe\u00f1an las plataformas en l\u00ednea que instintivamente metemos en la misma bolsa. \u00bfAmazon es una distribuidora? \u00bfUn centro comercial para vendedores terceros? \u00bfTodas las anteriores? Los sitios para compartir videos y otras plataformas de intercambio de contenido se asemejan m\u00e1s a cub\u00edculos de almacenamiento p\u00fablico que a emisoras, en el sentido de que son simples repositorios para que alguien m\u00e1s guarde sus cosas. Pero nos relacionamos con ellas cada vez m\u00e1s como nos relacionamos con los medios de comunicaci\u00f3n. Algunas veces. Aunque otras veces no es as\u00ed.<\/p>\n

Equilibrar los objetivos de las pol\u00edticas resulta en t\u00e9rminos medios complicados<\/strong><\/p>\n

Finalmente, hay que reconocer que regular las plataformas implica, en definitiva, que habr\u00e1 una gran cantidad de soluciones intermedias. A nadie le gusta esto. A todos nos gusta hablar de las opciones pol\u00edticas como si mi <\/em>propuesta fuera una escalera al cielo, y todas las otras opciones fueran el camino al infierno, pavimentado con buenas intenciones. Todos queremos referirnos a esto como \u00abel freno a las corporaciones ambiciosas\u00bb o \u00abla protecci\u00f3n de la innovaci\u00f3n y la libertad de expresi\u00f3n ante los voraces socialistas\u00bb. Y, para ser sincero, a veces las respuestas son bastante obvias. Podemos estar de acuerdo en que la libertad de expresi\u00f3n sobrevive tranquilamente bajo las leyes que previenen la publicidad falsa o enga\u00f1osa. Sin embargo, la mayor\u00eda de las veces, hablamos de equilibrar los t\u00e9rminos medios, y buscamos maximizar la probabilidad de obtener buenos resultados y minimizar las probabilidades de los malos.<\/p>\n

Un ejemplo obvio es el hecho de que es imposible hacer que las plataformas de redes sociales operen como common carriers<\/em> mientras vigilamos sus redes en busca de discurso del odio. De todos modos, esto no quiere decir que nuestras opciones sean binarias. Entre\u00a0bloquear una cita de la Declaraci\u00f3n de la Independencia<\/a>\u00a0y quedarse de brazos cruzados mientras grupos de odio organizan campa\u00f1as de acoso en l\u00ednea yace el t\u00e9rmino medio, que protege la mayor parte (pero, invariablemente, no la totalidad) de los discursos controvertidos al tiempo que previene la mayor parte (pero no la totalidad) del acoso en l\u00ednea.<\/p>\n

Pero luego tenemos algunos t\u00e9rminos medios que son m\u00e1s econ\u00f3micos o t\u00e9cnicos por naturaleza. Tomemos la \u00abneutralidad de las b\u00fasquedas\u00bb. El prop\u00f3sito ulterior <\/em>de un motor de b\u00fasqueda es ayudarnos a organizar el contenido de una manera \u00fatil. Un motor de b\u00fasqueda no puede ser \u00abneutral\u00bb de la misma manera que puede ser \u00abneutral\u00bb una red de banda ancha, porque no necesitamos que nuestro proveedor de banda ancha nos recomiende sitios web o aplicaciones. Pero escribir \u00abc\u00f3mo lidiar con los pr\u00e9stamos estudiantiles sin llorar a c\u00e1ntaros\u00bb en la barra de b\u00fasqueda exige que el motor recomiende sitios web o aplicaciones que sean relevantes para ese pedido. De hecho, presentar esa informaci\u00f3n es exactamente<\/em> lo que le pedimos al buscador que haga.<\/p>\n

Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, podemos reconocer que controlar la b\u00fasqueda en Internet \u2014ya sea mediante el desarrollo de algoritmos de motores de b\u00fasqueda o la preferencia o rechazo de tipos espec\u00edficos de resultados, como favorecer contenido afiliado o discriminar contenido enemigo o discursos poco populares\u2014 conlleva consecuencias enormes para la competencia, as\u00ed como tambi\u00e9n para otras pol\u00edticas sociales. Cuando expandimos el significado de \u00abb\u00fasqueda\u00bb a cualquier tipo de orden o recomendaci\u00f3n, como la manera en que Facebook presenta el contenido en el inicio o la manera en que Amazon recomienda sus productos, descubrimos otros problemas nuevos. Dejando de lado algunas cosas que obviamente queremos prohibir, como los experimentos secretos para manipular nuestras emociones<\/a>, la caracter\u00edstica que haga m\u00e1s efectiva la b\u00fasqueda puede traer consecuencias sociales negativas. Por ejemplo, \u00bfYouTube deber\u00eda sugerir videos relacionados en base a su algoritmo\u00a0cuando dichos videos lleven a una creciente radicalizaci\u00f3n<\/a>? \u00bfFacebook deber\u00eda seguir mostrando noticias relacionadas, a pesar de que refuerza el \u00abefecto burbuja\u00bb al que muchos culpan de fragmentar nuestra sociedad? \u00bfDeber\u00edamos hacer que los sistemas sean m\u00e1s inc\u00f3modos y menos eficientes con el objetivo de evitar\u00a0la adicci\u00f3n por dise\u00f1o<\/a>?<\/p>\n

Dif\u00edcil pero necesario<\/strong><\/p>\n

Este es el momento en el que aparecen el lobby de la industria y aquellos que est\u00e1n ideol\u00f3gicamente en contra de la regulaci\u00f3n y hablan de la \u00abhumildad regulatoria\u00bb y las \u00abconsecuencias no deseadas\u00bb y de que \u00ablo primero es no perjudicar\u00bb. El problema es, para seguir con los clich\u00e9s, que \u00abno actuar es en s\u00ed <\/em>una acci\u00f3n\u00bb. Vivimos en un mundo que est\u00e1 transform\u00e1ndose r\u00e1pidamente en un conjunto de plataformas digitales sumamente concentradas, e importantes aspectos de nuestra econom\u00eda y nuestras vidas giran en torno a ellas. Tras suspender el servicio a la Organizaci\u00f3n\/Publicaci\u00f3n nazi\u00a0Der Stormer,<\/em> Matthew Prince, el Director Ejecutivo de Cloudflare, se\u00f1al\u00f3 elocuentemente<\/a>: \u00abEn un futuro no muy lejano, si es que todav\u00eda no llegamos, puede que cuando quieras subir contenido a Internet necesites usar una empresa con una red gigante, como Cloudflare, Google, Microsoft, Facebook, Amazon, o Alibaba\u00bb. O,\u00a0de una manera un poco m\u00e1s directa<\/a>: \u00abLiteralmente, me despert\u00e9 de mal humor y decid\u00ed que alguien no deber\u00eda tener permitido estar en Internet. Nadie deber\u00eda tener este poder\u00bb.<\/p>\n

Prince se refer\u00eda espec\u00edficamente a la vigilancia de los discursos, pero ocurre lo mismo con respecto a la protecci\u00f3n al consumidor y la competencia. Ninguna empresa deber\u00eda poder determinar qu\u00e9 modelos de negocio son aceptables y cu\u00e1les deber\u00edan bloquearse por representar una potencial competencia. Las personas deber\u00edan poder confiar en que la protecci\u00f3n de su privacidad no depende de los caprichos y mejores esfuerzos de los directores ejecutivos. Tampoco es simplemente una cuesti\u00f3n de tama\u00f1o o dominio del mercado. Aunque la conversaci\u00f3n hasta el momento se centr\u00f3 en las plataformas m\u00e1s grandes, y si bien quedan muchas preocupaciones que aplican solamente a las plataformas dominantes, uno de los aspectos cr\u00edticos de la regulaci\u00f3n para sectores espec\u00edficos es identificar cu\u00e1ndo una pol\u00edtica p\u00fablica debe aplicarse a todos los proveedores, sin importar su tama\u00f1o. Por ejemplo, Reddit no puede ser considerado, bajo ning\u00fan punto de vista, como \u00abdominante\u00bb, ya que\u00a0al medir la cantidad de suscriptores o el total del tr\u00e1fico de redes sociales, ni siquiera se aproxima a la participaci\u00f3n de mercado de Facebook.<\/a>\u00a0No obstante, si intentamos determinar la pol\u00edtica correcta para equilibrar la moderaci\u00f3n de contenido y los miedos con respecto a la censura o las preocupaciones en cuanto al da\u00f1o a la innovaci\u00f3n, entonces, no importa si hablamos de Facebook o Reddit o alg\u00fan servicio incipiente que ni siquiera existe.<\/p>\n

Y, por supuesto, deber\u00edamos admitir que dicha regulaci\u00f3n puede elevar el costo de hacer negocios \u2014aunque tanto la experiencia como las investigaciones indican que estos miedos est\u00e1n muy exacerbados.<\/a> Aun as\u00ed, como dijimos anteriormente, equilibrar los objetivos de las pol\u00edticas resulta en t\u00e9rminos medios. No quedan dudas de que los c\u00f3digos de sanidad y seguridad contra incendios elevan el costo de los negocios de restaurantes nuevos. Tambi\u00e9n es cierto que sin esos c\u00f3digos de sanidad existen m\u00e1s casos de intoxicaci\u00f3n alimentaria y m\u00e1s incendios. Si bien podemos y debemos debatir esos t\u00e9rminos medios y d\u00f3nde establecer el equilibrio, el hecho de que una norma pueda imponer costos no es un furor autom\u00e1tico en ning\u00fan debate racional de pol\u00edticas.<\/p>\n

En la siguiente publicaci\u00f3n, intentar\u00e9 responder algunas de estas preguntas, empezando por la m\u00e1s b\u00e1sica: Espec\u00edficamente, \u00bfqu\u00e9 es lo que queremos regular?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As digital platforms have become increasingly important in our everyday lives, we\u2019ve recognized that the need for some sort of regulatory oversight increases. In the past, we\u2019ve talked about this in the context of privacy and what general sorts of due process rights dominant platforms owe their customers. Today, we make it clear that we have reached the point where we need sector-specific regulation focused on online digital platforms, not just application of existing antitrust or existing consumer protection laws. When platforms have become so central to our lives that a change in algorithm can dramatically crash third-party businesses, when social media plays such an important role in our lives that entire businesses exist to pump up your follower numbers, and when a multi-billion dollar industry exists for the sole purpose of helping businesses game search engine rankings, lawmakers need to stop talking hopefully about self-regulation and start putting in place enforceable rights to protect the public interest.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":14,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11120","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-insights"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nPlatform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard - Public Knowledge<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Public Knowledge promotes freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to affordable communications tools and creative works. We work to shape policy.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Public Knowledge promotes freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to affordable communications tools and creative works. We work to shape policy.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Public Knowledge\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2018-07-17T18:09:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/pk_social_logo-2.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"400\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"200\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Harold Feld\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Harold Feld\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"28 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Harold Feld\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/b99590cf56e076e16a21ef78eab7e144\"},\"headline\":\"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard\",\"datePublished\":\"2018-07-17T18:09:00+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/\"},\"wordCount\":5646,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Insights\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/\",\"name\":\"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard - Public Knowledge\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2018-07-17T18:09:00+00:00\",\"description\":\"Public Knowledge promotes freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to affordable communications tools and creative works. We work to shape policy.\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/\",\"name\":\"Public Knowledge\",\"description\":\"\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization\"},\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Public Knowledge\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/pk_social_logo-2.png\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/pk_social_logo-2.png\",\"width\":400,\"height\":200,\"caption\":\"Public Knowledge\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"}},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/b99590cf56e076e16a21ef78eab7e144\",\"name\":\"Harold Feld\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dc3548bcfaff8b17bc1878d291c1a62d97e5fb5f297182963e3e818f2f087f70?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dc3548bcfaff8b17bc1878d291c1a62d97e5fb5f297182963e3e818f2f087f70?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Harold Feld\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/author\/harold-feld\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO Premium plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard - Public Knowledge","description":"Public Knowledge promotes freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to affordable communications tools and creative works. We work to shape policy.","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard","og_description":"Public Knowledge promotes freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to affordable communications tools and creative works. We work to shape policy.","og_url":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/","og_site_name":"Public Knowledge","article_published_time":"2018-07-17T18:09:00+00:00","og_image":[{"width":400,"height":200,"url":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/pk_social_logo-2.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"Harold Feld","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Harold Feld","Est. reading time":"28 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/"},"author":{"name":"Harold Feld","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/b99590cf56e076e16a21ef78eab7e144"},"headline":"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard","datePublished":"2018-07-17T18:09:00+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/"},"wordCount":5646,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Insights"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/","url":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/","name":"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard - Public Knowledge","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#website"},"datePublished":"2018-07-17T18:09:00+00:00","description":"Public Knowledge promotes freedom of expression, an open internet, and access to affordable communications tools and creative works. We work to shape policy.","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/platform-regulation-part-i-why-platform-regulation-is-both-necessary-and-hard\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Platform Regulation Part I: Why Platform Regulation Is Both Necessary and Hard"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#website","url":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/","name":"Public Knowledge","description":"","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization","name":"Public Knowledge","url":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/pk_social_logo-2.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/12\/pk_social_logo-2.png","width":400,"height":200,"caption":"Public Knowledge"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"}},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/b99590cf56e076e16a21ef78eab7e144","name":"Harold Feld","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dc3548bcfaff8b17bc1878d291c1a62d97e5fb5f297182963e3e818f2f087f70?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/dc3548bcfaff8b17bc1878d291c1a62d97e5fb5f297182963e3e818f2f087f70?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Harold Feld"},"url":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/author\/harold-feld\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11120","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/14"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11120"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11120\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11120"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11120"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11120"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}