{"id":35521,"date":"2022-12-20T17:58:00","date_gmt":"2022-12-20T17:58:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/?p=35521"},"modified":"2022-12-20T19:06:01","modified_gmt":"2022-12-20T19:06:01","slug":"election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/","title":{"rendered":"Election Disinformation 2022: The Battlefield Shifts Again"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

After the presidential election in 2020, Public Knowledge reported<\/a> on how effectively digital platforms had countered the \u201celection misinformation war,\u201d meaning the torrent of election misinformation flowing across their platforms. We concluded, as we did during the COVID-19 pandemic<\/a>, that \u201cin a high-stakes and high-visibility situation, platforms will develop new standards and solutions to problems they previously claimed were impossible to solve.\u201d Days after that election, we theorized that the dominant platforms had taken sufficient accountability for the content on their platforms that Americans could safely get to the polls and vote. But we warned of a new risk: that an extended vote-counting period \u2013 due in part to COVID-19 precautions that encouraged early and mail-in voting \u2013 would allow misinformation to erode trust in the results after<\/em> the election. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

We published that blog post two months before the insurrection at the U.S. Capitol on January 6. On that day and in the weeks since, we have learned a great deal about the potential for violence stemming directly from election-related networked disinformation. (Misinformation \u2013 that is<\/a>, false information that isn\u2019t deliberately misleading \u2013 holds the potential for harm. However, because of its role in elections, in particular, we will focus here on networked dis<\/em>information: deliberately false information seeded and spread in the interest of power or profit, <\/em>in this case to influence elections.) We have seen how election-related conspiracy theories and disinformation, long after the actual election, can be used to justify a record-breaking number of new laws<\/a> designed to suppress voting or distort the electoral process, and to further the campaigns of election-denying political candidates<\/a> seeking to take over the administration of elections. We\u2019ve also seen harassment, intimidation, and threats<\/a> directed at the people \u2013 including volunteers \u2013 that administer U.S. elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

This was the context for our implementation of a weekly tracking system to monitor platform efforts surrounding the midterm elections. It was designed to monitor the platforms\u2019 own public policy pages and announcements about their strategies; researchers\u2019 reports about their effectiveness; and news reports about how platforms worked to mitigate election-related disinformation. Would the platforms heed these learnings from 2020 and step up their efforts for the 2022 midterm elections? What did we see from the platforms \u2013 and other media \u2013 this time around?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What we found were some of the same themes we had found in our reporting on COVID-19 and the 2020 election. That is, most social media platforms need more consultation with stakeholders on policy development; lack clearly articulated, stable policies with clear conditions for action; lack sufficient transparency about their enforcement and results; chronically underinvest in languages other than English; and need to provide greater access to actions and outcomes for researchers. But there was also an acceleration of a theme we found in our more recent reporting on the \u201cinformation war\u201d in Ukraine<\/a>: the movement of content to a range of alternative platforms, resulting in more consumer choice, but a fragmented landscape for the war against harmful disinformation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ample Time To Prepare<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whatever the platforms chose to do or not do for 2022, it wasn\u2019t for lack of awareness or time for preparation. As early as the summer of 2022, research and advocacy groups set up their scorecards<\/a> and tracking systems<\/a> and databases<\/a> and published their assessments and recommendations for platforms\u2019 efforts to combat disinformation related to the 2022 elections. Congress convened roundtables<\/a> and issued reports<\/a>, concluding that strains of disinformation related to the voting process and election integrity undermined public confidence in our elections and drove an unprecedented wave of threats of violence against election officials. National security agencies warned<\/a> of disinformation, including from foreign states, that could threaten the security of the American people and result in calls for violence by domestic extremists aimed at democratic institutions, political candidates, party offices, election events, and election workers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Stop-and-Start Approach to an Ongoing Risk<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

One of the first conclusions to come from organizations tracking platform efforts was that despite the higher stakes, and the proof that election-related disinformation could continue well past the relevant elections, several platforms had quietly discontinued their efforts to combat election disinformation soon after the 2020 election. For example, Twitter acknowledged<\/a> (several times<\/a>) that it wound down its Civic Integrity Policy in March 2021 and didn\u2019t revive it until August 2022. Facebook also lifted its ban<\/a> on political advertising in March 2021. Several platforms that didn\u2019t have specific election policies in 2020 \u2013 most notably TikTok \u2013 \u201claunched<\/a>\u201d them in August or September of 2022. Even then, YouTube had not communicated a dedicated elections misinformation policy for 2022 (it ultimately added a section to its general misinformation policy<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

After these platforms finally communicated their policies for 2022 in August, September, and October, they were roundly<\/a> criticized<\/a> by advocates and journalists<\/a> for simply bringing back the 2020 policies that had proved inadequate to stop the \u201cBig Lie\u201d of a fraudulent election and related calls to violence from propagating on their platforms. Critics pointed out the continuity of the Big Lie narrative from 2020 and the fact that some election deniers were now political candidates, raising the stakes for actual outcomes of the election. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Chronic Weaknesses in Enforcement Remain<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Whatever the platforms\u2019 policies, researchers and journalists continued to point out patchy enforcement \u2013 sometimes by design. Granted, it\u2019s become a predictable part of the election cycle for researchers and journalists to point out failures of moderation. For example, new labeling approaches failed to address posts of election candidates claiming the 2020 election was rigged, according to one report<\/a>. Another described<\/a> \u201congoing gaps\u201d and \u201csystemic failures\u201d in enforcement of policies. In the final weeks of the election cycle, one source assigned the platforms grades<\/a> for their ability to manage election disinformation, which ranged from \u201cB\u201d (usually for Twitter) to \u201cF\u201d (for TikTok).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While this post does not attempt to grade platforms, we provide some highlights of how their actions demonstrate each of our key themes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Twitter<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Twitter has played an outsized role in election politics since 2016 because of the high number of journalists, politicians, and influencers using the platform. That makes its policies and practices a matter of particular concern \u2013 a concern intensified by Elon Musk\u2019s purchase of the platform on October 27, 2022. Despite concerns that the takeover would create a free-for-all in the weeks leading up to the election, Twitter did not, and still has not, changed the Civic Integrity Policy<\/a> it introduced in 2018 and \u201cactivated<\/a>\u201d with some new enhancements in August of 2022. (Twitter representatives maintain that its \u201calways-on\u201d policies were still working to address election disinformation before August 22, but that begs the question of why an election-specific policy should be needed at all.) These Civic Integrity Policy enhancements included a new approach to labeling and upgraded \u201cprebunking,\u201d both research-proven<\/a> disinformation mitigation strategies; plus state-specific event hubs and a dedicated \u201cExplore\u201d tab focused on elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, as to enforcement, it\u2019s anyone\u2019s guess. For example, there were reports<\/a> that essential content moderation tools had been frozen after the takeover, but Twitter described<\/a> this as a risk mitigation strategy that did not significantly impact enforcement of its rules. There was a spate of racist and antisemitic posts<\/a> immediately upon the close of the sale, the result of orchestrated accounts testing the boundaries of Twitter\u2019s rules (and quickly removed). Rapid-fire layoffs and resignations, including at the highest levels of safety and integrity teams and among contractors, may have impacted content moderation, but given that both internal and external communications teams have mostly left the building<\/a>, it\u2019s difficult to more than speculate about what\u2019s going on behind the scenes. We do know that former President Trump, a regular election denier, has been reinstated (though he hasn\u2019t yet posted, potentially due to agreements with Truth Social funders), and that the promised \u201ccontent moderation council\u201d<\/a> to make that decision and govern any other change in policy has failed to appear. It remains to be seen whether, as one highly respected former Twitter executive postulated<\/a>, \u201cthe moderating influence of advertisers, regulators and\u2026app stores\u201d will impact policy or enforcement under Twitter\u2019s new owner. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meta<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Meta continued its approach<\/a> of allowing information that is \u201cnewsworthy and in the public interest\u201d to remain even if it violates Meta\u2019s community standards (though it may label such content), and of exempting most politicians from fact-checking. Meta noted that labels would be used in a more \u201ctargeted and strategic way\u201d (i.e., less often) based on findings that users felt they were overused in 2020. It also continued to favor strategies that leaned toward free expression<\/a>. These include \u201cauthenticity and transparency\u201d (rather than restrictions on content) for political ads; elevating sources of authoritative information (rather than limiting the spread of disinformation); labeling; fact-checking; and user controls. These strategies, plus changes in Meta\u2019s organization, including dispersal of much of its election integrity team<\/a> and dismantling of the CrowdTangle<\/a> (note: paywall) social analytics tool used by researchers to track movements of social content in real time, were also seen as a shift<\/a> in emphasis away from election integrity. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

YouTube<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

YouTube, which kicks off its election misinformation policy<\/a> by emphasizing its tight focus on content with \u201cserious risk of egregious harm\u201d and \u201creal-world harm,\u201d also focuses on a strategy of \u201craising up<\/a>\u201d other information \u2013 including authoritative sources, fact-checks, labels, and information panels \u2013 to offset disinformation. Of the major platforms, YouTube was among the ones with the most change \u2013 maybe because, in general, the platform\u2019s efforts were seen as among the least effective in 2020<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

TikTok<\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n

TikTok was still primarily an entertainment platform for younger people during the 2020 elections, but now its huge reach<\/a>; short-form video content; powerful but opaque algorithms; and sometimes-suspect Chinese ownership has made it a powerful incubator<\/a> of false information. For 2022, TikTok continued its emphasis on paid political content, fact-checking, labels, and its election information portal. However, the platform provides even less transparency, and fewer tools, for researchers to understand the enforcement or outcomes of its policies. In one report,<\/a> TikTok failed to catch 90% of ads featuring false and misleading messages about elections. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

General Observations<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Across platforms, we also saw continued under-resourcing of content moderation<\/a> in languages other than English. Meta may have made the most progress by extending its fact-checking and media literacy efforts in Spanish, but disregarded its base of users in virtually every other language. Civil rights and advocacy organizations maintain that moderators still lack the cultural context and understanding<\/a> of lived experience needed to mitigate disinformation efforts that are often targeted at distinct communities.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

And there was the same lack of transparency and clarity from 2020 to 2022 about what the platforms were experiencing and what they were doing about it. In their reporting, we only still get the numerator <\/em>of platforms\u2019 content moderation efforts: dollars spent on content moderation\u2026of how many in total? Accounts addressed\u2026of how many discovered? Posts removed\u2026of how many that are still spreading harmful content? Unless we can understand what proportion of the problem is being addressed, and how, we can\u2019t assume the platforms\u2019 efforts are as successful as they claim.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On Dominant Platforms, a Skirmish More Than a War<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

All that said, strains of disinformation on the dominant platforms, based on reports from researchers, were muted relative to 2020. There are multiple reasons for this. First, citizens are more familiar \u2013 and some are fed up \u2013 with the themes of election disinformation and they were more skeptical and more wary of what they passed along during the midterms. Offline election officials, trusted community sources, and online misinformation experts did a better job pushing back<\/a> on misleading narratives. Election outcomes were predicted to favor Republicans, who hesitated to claim election fraud while their candidates were ahead (this became the basis of a particularly popular Saturday Night Live sketch<\/a> focusing on Kari Lake\u2019s daily about-faces on the topic). And purveyors of disinformation either expected or experienced mitigation efforts from the dominant platforms. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

New Fronts in the Misinformation War<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

But these purveyors of disinformation also moved on. One of the trends from the 2020 election that accelerated in 2022 was the movement of content to alternative platforms, many of which have less robust policies, fewer resources for enforcement, or explicit \u201canything goes\u201d approaches to content moderation. (As noted above, this was also a theme in our reporting on the information war in Ukraine<\/a>.) Some of these \u201calt\u201d platforms exist for the sole purpose of providing voice for \u201calternative\u201d \u2013 including extreme \u2013 views, yet they are a news source for a growing subset of Americans<\/a>. Gab, Truth Social, Gettr, Rumble, and especially<\/a> Telegram entered election season<\/a> with no policies explicitly<\/em> around election-related content, and some of the most threatening and violent content, muted on the major platforms, migrated there. There were also higher volumes of disinformation in private groups, robocalls, text messages, and \u2013 for the first time \u2013 podcasts, which came under scrutiny<\/a> for their hosts \u201cjust asking questions\u201d about election integrity. The channel fragmentation and intimacy of podcasts, and the difficulty of analyzing audio content for keywords, may make them a particularly potent vector of disinformation in the future. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Complex and Interconnected Battlefield<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

While our focus at Public Knowledge for this tracking is platform accountability, it has to be said that any effort to mitigate disinformation \u2013 about elections or any other topic \u2013 is made more challenging in an environment where networked disinformation is deployed as a political strategy, including by the candidates themselves<\/em>. Disinformation can originate just as easily on fringe websites as in political rallies on the nightly news. We don\u2019t suggest that digital platforms have the only responsibility for managing its impact on our elections, our civility, and our democracy.

Citizens should practice digital literacy and be mindful of what they share, and why. Politicians (despite some platform policies to the contrary) should be held to a higher<\/em> standard to warrant trust and votes. We would make the case that regulation designed to ensure responsible content from broadcasters should play a role, and watch for the rise of \u201cpink slime\u201d news sites masquerading as local authorities on both sides. And we have made the case that any role for regulation in algorithmic distribution of content<\/a> should be very carefully considered before adoption by policymakers. All that said, we are still asking the platforms to do their part.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

After the presidential election in 2020, Public Knowledge reported on how effectively digital platforms had countered the \u201celection misinformation war,\u201d meaning the torrent of election misinformation flowing across their platforms. We concluded, as we did during the COVID-19 pandemic, that \u201cin a high-stakes and high-visibility situation, platforms will develop new standards and solutions to problems they previously claimed were impossible to solve.\u201d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":189,"featured_media":35522,"parent":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[11,14],"class_list":["post-35521","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-insights","tag-content-moderation","tag-platform-regulation"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nElection Disinformation 2022: The Battlefield Shifts Again - Public Knowledge<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"In the wake of the 2022 election cycle, we explore how platforms responded and adapted to some of the lessons learned in 2020 about disinformation.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Election Disinformation 2022: The Battlefield Shifts Again\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"In the wake of the 2022 election cycle, we explore how platforms responded and adapted to some of the lessons learned in 2020 about disinformation.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Public Knowledge\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2022-12-20T17:58:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2022-12-20T19:06:01+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Website-Pictures-2.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"2000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"1000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Lisa Macpherson\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Lisa Macpherson\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"11 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Lisa Macpherson\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/757e28331d7a5e31a3290be1d16d219b\"},\"headline\":\"Election Disinformation 2022: The Battlefield Shifts Again\",\"datePublished\":\"2022-12-20T17:58:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2022-12-20T19:06:01+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/\"},\"wordCount\":2368,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2022\/12\/Website-Pictures-2.png\",\"keywords\":[\"Content Moderation\",\"Platform Regulation\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Insights\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/election-disinformation-2022-the-battlefield-shifts-again\/\",\"name\":\"Election Disinformation 2022: The Battlefield Shifts Again - 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