{"id":37964,"date":"2025-05-21T15:34:11","date_gmt":"2025-05-21T15:34:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/?p=37964"},"modified":"2025-11-22T20:48:28","modified_gmt":"2025-11-22T20:48:28","slug":"the-conservative-political-playbook-driving-the-ftc-platform-censorship-inquiry","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/the-conservative-political-playbook-driving-the-ftc-platform-censorship-inquiry\/","title":{"rendered":"The Conservative Political Playbook Driving the FTC Platform Censorship Inquiry"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The Federal Trade Commission recently posted a request for public comment<\/a> on the topic of \u201ctechnology platform censorship.\u201d The FTC\u2019s request consists of a series of questions based on the premise that platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and X (previously Twitter) disproportionately \u201cdeny or degrade\u201d users\u2019 access to services based on the content of the users\u2019 speech or their affiliations. The request is rooted in a years-long, escalating series of claims that digital platforms systematically censor conservative political speech, and that information researchers, nonprofit advocacy groups, advertisers and their agencies, the media, and various branches of the federal government under the Biden administration conspired with platforms to curtail free expression. Most recently, this conspiratorial campaign has manifested as a cross-agency effort among the FTC, Federal Communications Commission, and the Department of Justice to \u201csmash\u201d what they call \u201cthe censorship cartel<\/a>.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Most people not closely following inside the beltway politics may wonder where this \u201ccensorship cartel” of technology platforms, advertisers, and academic researchers came from, and why it needs smashing at the highest levels of government. Here, we\u2019ll review the political history of the FTC\u2019s request, dismantle the notion of the \u201ccensorship cartel,\u201d and then suggest ways in which the agency could actually use its powers related to consumer protection and competition to improve content moderation and ensure free speech on technology platforms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

First, an important note on language: Censorship refers to the use of government<\/em> force to suppress speech and other forms of expression. The First Amendment of the US Constitution protects us from the government <\/em>restricting freedom of speech, press, religion, and association. When private platforms amplify, label, remove, or reduce the visibility of content, or suspend or ban users who violate their terms of service, it is called content moderation. This isn\u2019t just semantics. Content moderation policies are one of the platforms\u2019 principal means of differentiation and competition in the marketplace<\/em> (both to attract audiences and to attract advertisers).<\/em> We use the term \u201ccensorship\u201d in this post not because it is accurate but to make it clear we are referring to the relevant FTC docket<\/a>. For more on this topic, see our recent article<\/a>, \u201c\u2018Censorship\u2019: President Trump keeps using this word, but I do not think it means what he thinks it means.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Real Incentives Behind Technology Platform Content Moderation<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Another important framing note is that users\u2019 own behavior drives most of what they see online.<\/em> That is the straightforward result of how most technology platforms make money: by selling users\u2019 attention to advertisers in the form of ads targeted to the users\u2019 interests and behaviors. Because of that business model, the fundamental machinery of most technology platforms consists of algorithms, fueled by behavioral data and calibrated to precisely target and deliver content to users in a way that maximizes users\u2019 attention. Users\u2019 attention is the platforms\u2019 only inventory<\/em>; it\u2019s what they sell to advertisers. So, platforms are, above all, incentivized to serve more <\/em>of whatever their users post, dwell on, like, comment on, and share. The platforms call these user behaviors \u201cengagement.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here\u2019s the tricky part: To optimize shareholder value, platforms must maximize engagement among their current users while keeping their platform appealing enough to attract new users and<\/em> advertisers seeking to promote their brands. New user growth is a key measure for financial markets (e.g., it drives stock price for shareholders), and advertiser revenue fuels current profits (e.g., it drives big bonuses for executives). That is the inherent tension in content moderation: The content that best engages users may not be content with which advertisers want to associate their brands.<\/strong> The financial imperatives that drive platforms\u2019 content moderation are only somewhat and occasionally tempered by real or threatened government regulation or pressure from the public or the media.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Content moderation on technology platforms is conducted through a combination of automated and human processes. Given the volume of content on most platforms, artificial intelligence first identifies content candidates for moderation based on keywords or machine-recognizable signals. Users may also flag content for moderation. Human reviewers then make the final determination of whether or how to moderate the content. (Critics have claimed<\/a> the \u201cviewpoint discrimination\u201d by platforms can be attributed to the \u201cleft-leaning corporate cultures of technology companies.\u201d But the human reviewers are often contract employees based in foreign countries with low-cost labor models, difficult working conditions<\/a>, and likely little interest in the ideological crosswinds of their employers\u2019 employers.) Some platforms may differentiate themselves by giving certain \u201cmoderation privileges<\/a>\u201d to a subset of users who may be self-appointed (e.g., Reddit), appointed through semi-democratic processes (e.g., Wikipedia), or selected by the platform to supplement automated processes (e.g., community notes on X, Meta platforms<\/a>, and more recently, TikTok<\/a>). <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In fact, the FTC itself, in this very docket<\/a>, has removed or redacted content in attachments from some public comments due to their being \u201cinappropriate\u201d or full of \u201cprofanity.\u201d Apparently, even the FTC has its own community standards \u2013 content moderation rules, if you will \u2013 and enforces them rigorously on its own platform. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Both the automated and human components of content moderation have the potential<\/em> for bias. AI systems are known to have societal biases<\/a> embedded in their training sets and among the coding teams that create them. Human moderators can also bring their own life experiences and biases into their decision-making. However, this does not mean that political bias in outcomes is the result of any deliberate choices by the platforms. In fact, while empirical research has consistently found evidence of societal bias (as described below), it has consistently failed to find evidence of bias based on political affiliation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

How Did We Get Here? The Origins of \u201cConservative Censorship\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Public discussion regarding the societal impact of platform content moderation began in the early 2010s due to three factors: <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    \n
  1. concerns about the impact of a few highly centralized platforms on users\u2019 free expression;\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  2. the velocity of false information<\/a> exploding on technology platforms and its potential effect on public health and safety; and\u00a0<\/li>\n\n\n\n
  3. the hypothesis that algorithms were pushing users toward increasingly extreme sources of content.\u00a0<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n\n\n\n

    When the dialogue entered the political sphere, these concerns were initially bipartisan. The earliest research into platform content moderation indicated that the circulation of \u201cmisinformation\u201d (defined as false information spread unintentionally) was not pervasive (example here<\/a>). But researchers found substantial evidence that \u201cdisinformation\u201d (defined as false information spread with intent) often appeared as concentrated campaigns designed to gain power or profit (example here<\/a>). Researchers began to focus on how these narratives were seeded and spread, and how digital and traditional channels interacted to get them to scale. The result was a growing body of research illuminating the intersection of disinformation, political campaigns, and platform content moderation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Accusations of over-moderation of conservative viewpoints by liberal Silicon Valley elites had first ignited in 2016, when the online journal Gizmodo published claims by former Facebook employees<\/a> (later refuted<\/a>) that they had suppressed news stories from the platform\u2019s now-defunct \u201cTrending Topics\u201d page because they were of interest to conservative users. There was a major surge of research interest in the topic of political content moderation in 2018 due to revelations of efforts by the Russia-based Internet Research Agency to influence the 2016 US elections, and of Cambridge Analytica providing user analytics to influence political campaigns, such as the 2016 Brexit vote, using personally targeted ads. Given the political dynamics in both the US 2016 presidential election and Brexit, this research caused further divergence in political perspectives on content moderation and heightened accusations from conservative policymakers of online censorship. For the platforms, this created two countervailing political pressures that continue today: pressure on platforms from those on the political left to identify and moderate more<\/em> content in the interest of protecting health, safety, and democratic institutions, and pressure on platforms from those on the political right to moderate less<\/em> content in the interest of advancing their political goals. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The accusations of censorship from political elites on the right reached a fever pitch in 2020. That year, researchers and platforms \u2013 sometimes in collaboration with government agencies \u2013 focused intently on platform content moderation related to the COVID-19 pandemic and the US national elections, both of which had become highly politicized topics. (Public Knowledge assessed and reported on platforms\u2019 content moderation for these events at the time. See our blog post about platform content moderation for COVID-19<\/a>, and our blog post for the 2020 elections<\/a> for more information.) One dominant theme of the research was that engagement in false information online was asymmetric, with conservative audiences \u2013 especially older, male audiences \u2013 more likely to share it. In fact, as one scientist and correspondent wrote<\/a>, \u201c…study after study has concluded that in the US, misinformation circulates more widely on the right of the political spectrum.\u201d These findings compounded the sense that researchers were part of a broader effort to suppress conservative voices. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Partly in response to the accusations of censorship, researchers started to publish studies and reports that undermined the idea that conservative viewpoints were over-moderated. They argued that when content was moderated disproportionately, it was because of disproportionate use of false information, low-quality information sources, and offensive language in violation of platform policies. (Research also showed that marginalized communities were far more likely to have their content moderated<\/a> even when it was not violative<\/em> due to how content policies are crafted, bias in automated moderation algorithms, content filters that lack cultural context, and the inability of automated systems to detect language nuances.) Conservative politicians and their allies began to attack and discredit the researchers<\/a> and their funders, simultaneously pressuring platforms to loosen their moderation policies<\/a>. Dedicated research laboratories like the Stanford Internet Observatory (established in 2019) and its Election Integrity Partnership (in 2020) eventually became the focus of political attacks<\/a>, requests for information<\/a>, and lawsuits<\/a>. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    President Trump first tried to exert actual government authority against \u201cconservative censorship\u201d at the end of his first term by issuing an Executive Order<\/a> directing the FTC and FCC to launch various investigations, rulemakings, and enforcement actions (though nothing much came of the effort). The censorship fever climbed even higher, becoming an article of faith for Trump\u2019s followers, when he was deplatformed from Twitter and Facebook for his role in the riot at the US Capitol on January 6, 2021. Both Florida and Texas passed laws claiming to end \u201ccensorship\u201d and ensure \u201cneutrality\u201d of social media platforms. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    In Washington, Representative Jim Jordan (R-OH) has led the charge among Republicans to keep alive Congressional allegations that platforms and the researchers that investigate them are biased against the right. Eventually, Jordan\u2019s accusations extended to civil society organizations, advertisers and their agencies, government agencies focused on national security and foreign disinformation campaigns, and even the traditional media. As the chair of the House of Representatives\u2019 Judiciary Committee (and the subcommittee he founded, the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government), he spearheaded Congressional reports, hearings, and letters advancing the conspiratorial idea<\/a> of a \u201ccensorship industrial complex\u201d or \u201ccensorship cartel\u201d that even implicated the Biden White House. (For more information on Rep. Jordan and his attacks on advertisers and their agencies, see our article, \u201cAntitrust or Anti-truth? Jim Jordan\u2019s Latest Attack on the \u2018War on Disinformation<\/a>.\u2019\u201d) Jordan\u2019s efforts have been amplified by Republican state lawmakers and attorneys general, who initiated lawsuits and state legislation to constrain platform content moderation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    These accusations were the basis of the 2023 Supreme Court case Murthy v. Missouri,<\/em><\/a> in which the plaintiffs claimed the Biden Administration had colluded with platforms to censor content. The Court rejected the claims, finding that \u201c…the evidence indicates that the platforms had independent incentives to moderate content and often exercised their own judgment.\u201d (For more information on how Murthy v. Missouri<\/em> manifested an orchestrated effort to equate government collaboration with platforms with \u201ccensorship,\u201d read our article, \u201cA Supreme Court Ruling in Murthy v. Missouri<\/em> Could Help \u2013 or Hinder \u2013 Democracy Next Year<\/a>.\u201d)<\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Now, three months into the second Trump administration, the FTC\u2019s public inquiry,<\/a> related efforts by the FCC, and potentially collaboration with the DOJ extend this effort into federal agencies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    There Is a Role for the FTC That Does Not Involve Regulating for \u201cNeutrality\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Public Knowledge has written extensively<\/a> about how public policy should be used to improve content moderation and ensure free expression. There is ample room for improvement in how the platforms design and enforce their content moderation policies.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    But courts \u2013 for example, in Prager Univ. v. Google LLC<\/em><\/a> <\/em>in 2020 and more recently in the Supreme Court case Moody v. Netchoice<\/em><\/a> in 2024 \u2013 have affirmed that content moderation falls within private technology platforms\u2019 First Amendment rights. The 9th Circuit found in X Corp v. Bonta<\/a> that the government can\u2019t compel platforms to take positions on what controversial terms like \u201chate speech\u201d mean. Combined with users\u2019 own expressive rights, this implies a limited role for the government in influencing platform content moderation. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    Given the history we outline here, the FTC should resist the temptation to directly intervene in substantive content moderation controversies. <\/em>Instead, there are several constructive ways in which the FTC could use its powers under Section 5<\/a> related to consumer protection and competition to help ensure free speech on technology platforms. This is possible to accomplish in a content-neutral, constitutionally compatible way. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

    The FTC should:<\/p>\n\n\n\n