{"id":38267,"date":"2025-09-05T15:21:03","date_gmt":"2025-09-05T15:21:03","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/?p=38267"},"modified":"2025-09-05T15:21:07","modified_gmt":"2025-09-05T15:21:07","slug":"google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/","title":{"rendered":"Google Search Remedies: A Missed Opportunity for Tech Accountability"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

This week, Judge Amit Mehta issued his long-awaited remedies decision<\/a> in U.S. v. Google<\/em> (filed back in 2020<\/a>), the landmark case where the Department of Justice and a bipartisan coalition of states successfully proved<\/a> that Google violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by using billions in exclusionary contracts to freeze out rivals. The remedies to this case were supposed to be the salve for Google\u2019s market harms, designed to restore competition, innovation, and choice in the online search market. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

A Quick Overview<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

At Public Knowledge, we advocated<\/a> for structural and behavioral remedies that deny Google the fruits of its illegal behavior and prevent further abuse of its scale advantage online. The structural remedies we support include both the divestiture of the Chrome browser and Android OS. The behavioral remedies we support include mandated sharing of real-time performance data and search\/ad syndication APIs<\/a> on fair terms, as well as a complete ban on default agreements (including payments to be the default browser on Apple devices). Additionally, we advocated for a Technical Committee (TC) with full audit authority and power to impose mandatory data retention and transparency obligations. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Instead of these bold structural or behavioral changes, Judge Mehta handed down a more restrained decision that preserves Google\u2019s freedom to engage in anticompetitive conduct despite openly admitting that the anticompetitive conduct exists. By neglecting to implement any of these remedies, the core of Google\u2019s exclusionary strategy that spurred this case \u2013 Google\u2019s ability to weaponize its scale, buy and secure default status across the ecosystem, and preserve its control of search traffic \u2013 remains intact. <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

On Structural Remedies<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The court flat-out refused to impose structural remedies. No divestiture of Chrome. No contingent spin-off of Android. Despite the government making clear arguments that these remedies would meaningfully open the market, Judge Mehta ruled that plaintiffs \u201coverreached\u201d by seeking them. This was the court\u2019s biggest mistake. Judge Mehta\u2019s inaction on structural separation is inconsistent with the long history of remedies for Section 2 violations, dating back to Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States<\/em> in 1911. Divestiture, acknowledged<\/a> as one of the most important antitrust remedies, is necessary in this case for continued relief from Google\u2019s anticompetitive harm. Chrome and Android are the critical distribution channels that funnel users<\/a> into Google Search. By leaving them intact under Google\u2019s control, the court preserved the very monopoly that makes the company\u2019s default deals so powerful. This means rivals will still face nearly insurmountable barriers to scaling up, and advertisers will continue to be locked into Google\u2019s system, paying higher prices in the text advertising market with no true alternatives. Consumers will likewise see little change \u2013 the markets for search and search text advertising will continue to orbit<\/a> around Google, rather than open up to new entrants or new ad experiences. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On Behavioral Remedies<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The court did<\/em> bar Google from maintaining exclusive<\/em> contracts with device makers, carriers, and browsers that were at the heart of the government\u2019s case. This means Google cannot tie the Play Store or other must-have apps on Android to forced pre-installation of Google Search, Chrome, or Gemini. Nor can Google punish partners for distributing rival search engines or AI assistants. This is good, and allows Android users to download the search applications of their choosing on their device more easily. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the court declined to prohibit billion-dollar payments to Apple (for Safari) and to Android OEMs and carriers (through revenue-sharing agreements) that secure its search engine as the preset or default<\/em> option on browsers and devices. Judge Mehta reasoned that ending those payments would \u201ccripple\u201d downstream partners. To be sure, there is a difference between giants like Apple or Samsung, who hardly \u2018need\u2019 these payments, and smaller players like Mozilla who depend on them through their own revenue-sharing agreements<\/a>. But by accepting Google\u2019s framing<\/a> that such payments were necessary across the board, the court treated these billion-dollar tolls as legitimate business support rather than what they are: mechanisms that lock competitors out of distribution channels. By leaving them in place, the court effectively sanctioned the most powerful lever of Google\u2019s dominance. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On the data-based remedies, the court\u2019s restrained approach is equally short-sighted. Judge Mehta ruled that Google must provide rivals with a one-time snapshot of its search index rather than ongoing access. But the fruits of Google\u2019s anticompetitive conduct don\u2019t just consist of a frozen snapshot of the index; Google possesses an ever-growing trove of user queries, interaction data, and advertising data, largely thanks <\/em>to Google\u2019s exclusionary conduct that secured its positioning on user devices. As rivals cannot close the gap in relevance, scale, or monetization, Google\u2019s ability to weaponize its scale and data advantage is secured. By declining to grant market competitors ongoing access, Judge Mehta\u2019s decision all but ensures that the search market will continue to have competitors running uphill to catch up. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On a Technical Committee<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The court also pared back DOJ\u2019s vision for a Technical Committee. DOJ had asked for a broad compliance structure with sweeping authority, along with a compliance officer inside Google who would personally certify adherence to the remedy orders. Judge Mehta rejected that broader scheme, instead creating a narrower TC tasked only with monitoring compliance. The TC can review data, documents, and employees, but it will not<\/em> police Google\u2019s wider conduct, its investment decisions, or its future strategies. Judge Mehta also narrowed the requested timeline for the TC from 10 years to six years (Google had asked for three). This is a serious weakness. Judge Mehta deemed the 10-year proposal too long given the remedies he decided on. But in the life of a 20-year-old monopoly with a history of anticompetitive conduct, this timeline is necessary for accountability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This combination of a shorter time frame and more limited TC opens the door for Google to frustrate the emergence of new competition through what critics call  \u201cmalicious compliance<\/a>\u201d \u2013 taking actions that the company claims comply with the order, but in reality preserve barriers to entry and continue to entrench market power. For example, the one-time snapshot of the search index as issued could be the least beneficial version possible for rival search engines to use. Since the TC cannot take direct action, it may be forced to return to court to argue for additional authority or remedies to address whether the \u201csnapshot\u201d adequately complies with the court\u2019s order. This will require new briefings and new hearings. This may also dissuade competitors from investing time and effort trying to use the data-based remedies, delay the entry of new competitors, and generally give rivals far less time to establish themselves before Google can resume its anticompetitive practices with the tools Judge Mehta has left intact.  By refusing to give the TC authority over broader conduct, Judge Mehta guaranteed that Google can continue finding new ways to entrench its dominance outside the narrow scope of this order.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where We Go From Here<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

What DOJ Can Do<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Justice Department can appeal to the D.C. Circuit. <\/strong>But how does this work? District courts enjoy broad discretion<\/a> when crafting remedies. However, that discretion must still honor antitrust\u2019s core remedial commands<\/a>: unfetter the market, deny the fruits of illegality, and prevent recurrence. It is under these elements DOJ could challenge the remedies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

On structural relief, Judge Mehta labeled Chrome divestiture a \u201cpoor fit,\u201d emphasized the need for a clear causal connection between unlawful conduct and market power, and concluded that plaintiffs had not shown that behavioral remedies would be ineffective on their own. He rejected the proposed Android divestiture for similar reasons. Judge Mehta also expressed concern that Google\u2019s network and Chrome were so intertwined that divestiture \u201cwould be incredibly messy and highly risky.\u201d An appeal can contend that this misapplies the remedial framework, which allows \u201cquite drastic measures<\/a>\u201d when they reasonably tend to dissipate the restraints and prevent evasion, and that the court undervalued evidence showing how Google\u2019s ownership of these business lines made its illegal conduct possible. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

On behavioral relief, there\u2019s substantial nuance at play. The Supreme Court in International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States <\/em>prescribed<\/a> civil suits a duty to \u201cpry open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants\u2019 illegal restraints.\u201d While the D.C. District Court in U.S. v. Microsoft Corp (\u201cMicrosoft III\u201d) <\/em>clarified<\/a> that terminating the monopoly is not a free-standing remedial goal, it also reaffirmed that courts must craft relief strong enough to address competitive harm, not merely halt the proven conduct. Judge Mehta acknowledged the logic of a default payment ban, stating<\/a> it would indeed \u201cpry open the market,\u201d and the rationale for a payment ban is sound. Yet, citing the clarified remedial framework of Microsoft III<\/em>, he still declined to impose it primarily because of hardship to OEMs, carriers, and browser developers. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But there is no legal basis for the idea that if a monopolist shares some of the fruits of its exclusionary conduct with others, that a court should allow that conduct to continue. Judge Mehta\u2019s balancing of these elements reflects a surprising level of judicial restraint; remedies should not be undermined due to fear of disrupting partners, especially if the monopoly remains intact. This may create a legal foothold for appeal.     <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In short, DOJ may suitably argue that Judge Mehta\u2019s remedy does not adequately unfetter the market or deny the fruits of the violation. But will DOJ take this approach? It\u2019s unknown. It\u2019s still unclear<\/a> if the Trump administration will facilitate robust antitrust enforcement. While DOJ hailed<\/a> the remedies as a victory (despite them falling far short of what was asked for), Antitrust Chief Gail Slater seems to be weighing her options<\/a> on an appeal. In any case, if DOJ stops here, it signals that even when monopolists are caught<\/em>, the core of their exclusionary strategy can emerge untouched.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Lawmakers Can Do<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

A legislative solution is needed to ensure gatekeepers like Google don\u2019t just slip through the cracks of judicial caution. Courts can rule on individual anticompetitive conduct after it occurs, but they are not built to establish law that standardizes market behavior and responds effectively to new technologies. Moreover, even if DOJ appeals, the process will take time. Meanwhile, the limited remedies in place will do little to shift the market. This is why Congress must act \u2013 passage of digital platform antitrust legislation is long overdue. <\/strong> Google\u2019s market abuses, and Big Tech\u2019s market abuses by extension, demand more than piecemeal fixes from court decisions. We need sector-specific legislation<\/a> that prevents online gatekeepers from abusing their dominance at the expense of an open internet and consumer choice. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

What Regulators Can Do<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Judge Mehta recognizes that remedies in a case like this need technical expertise to enforce in the form of a TC. But the committee\u2019s even narrower mandate than proposed highlights that courts can only react to past violations<\/a> and tether oversight tightly to what was proven in litigation. This was especially noteworthy given that Judge Mehta desired to exercise a \u201chealthy dose of humility\u201d as he summarily rejected the AI-related remedies (publisher opt-out, for example). In an effort to avoid \u201c[gazing] into the crystal ball,\u201d the court acknowledged its lack of expertise in forecasting AI\u2019s trajectory. For this reason, it\u2019s clear that what consumers need is not just a small compliance body bound by one case and backwards-looking view of the market. America needs <\/strong>a digital regulator<\/strong><\/a> with the power to monitor gatekeepers proactively, update rules as technology changes, and prevent abuses before they take root.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n

DOJ fought hard and proved its case. But Judge Mehta\u2019s remedies show why legislative and regulatory reform is urgent. Without it, Google and other tech giants will continue to wield their data, dollars, and defaults to control the online ecosystem. Judge Mehta\u2019s liability ruling last year was a milestone: it confirmed Google abused its monopoly. But remedies are what matter for the future. By this measure, this week\u2019s decision is a disappointment. Consumers still deserve a world where competition thrives and innovation flourishes. The lesson learned from Judge Mehta\u2019s remedies is simple: where the courts won\u2019t deliver, lawmakers and regulators must act.<\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The long-awaited decision falls short.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":213,"featured_media":37018,"parent":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[14],"class_list":["post-38267","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-insights","tag-platform-regulation"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nGoogle Search Remedies: A Missed Opportunity for Tech Accountability - Public Knowledge<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Judge Mehta released long-awaited decision on remedies in the Google antitrust trial \u2014 but the ruling falls short of addressing systemic harms.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Google Search Remedies: A Missed Opportunity for Tech Accountability\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Judge Mehta released long-awaited decision on remedies in the Google antitrust trial \u2014 but the ruling falls short of addressing systemic harms.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Public Knowledge\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2025-09-05T15:21:03+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2025-09-05T15:21:07+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/Legal-Filing-.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"2000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"1000\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Elise Phillips\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@elise__phillips\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Elise Phillips\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"9 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Elise Phillips\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#\/schema\/person\/ef34e6468f0db9ef44ed663e0cf0f45b\"},\"headline\":\"Google Search Remedies: A Missed Opportunity for Tech Accountability\",\"datePublished\":\"2025-09-05T15:21:03+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2025-09-05T15:21:07+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/\"},\"wordCount\":2070,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/#organization\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/#primaryimage\"},\"thumbnailUrl\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/06\/Legal-Filing-.png\",\"keywords\":[\"Platform Regulation\"],\"articleSection\":[\"Insights\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/publicknowledge.org\/google-search-remedies-a-missed-opportunity-for-tech-accountability\/\",\"name\":\"Google Search Remedies: A Missed Opportunity for Tech Accountability - 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